China’s Digital Diplomacy and Strategic Responses to the CHIPS and Science Acts
Abstract
The US CHIPS and Science Act, enacted in 2022, serves as a key pillar in the US strategy to secure technological supremacy and national security through revitalizing domestic semiconductor manufacturing. This article addresses two core questions: What are China’s strategic responses to the CHIPS and Science Act, and what are the global implications of this U.S.–China technological rivalry? Using a qualitative case study approach, the analysis explores China’s industrial policies, diplomatic strategies, and legal instruments designed to safeguard its technological sovereignty. Findings show that China mobilizes large-scale investments in the semiconductor sector through the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, strengthens research and development, and imposes export restrictions on critical minerals. Simultaneously, China deepens partnerships within multipolar forums such as BRICS and expands the Digital Silk Road initiative to reduce reliance on Western systems. This rivalry has far-reaching consequences, including global supply chain disruptions, fragmentation of international technology standards, and the rise of new geopolitical blocs. The article argues that the U.S.–China technological rivalry is not only economic in nature but also reshapes the global order through digital diplomacy and technology-driven power dynamics.
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Kim, H. J. (2016). Will IR theory with Chinese characteristics be a powerful alternative? Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(1), 59–79. Scopus. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pov014
Lewin, A. Y. (2024). China Innovation Challenge: A Reprise. Management and Organization Review, 20(6), 958–962. https://doi.org/10.1017/mor.2024.44
Luo, Y., & Van Assche, A. (2023). The rise of techno-geopolitical uncertainty: Implications of the United States CHIPS and Science Act. Journal of International Business Studies, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-023-00620-3
Mishra, A. K., Gadhia, J. N., Kubendran, N., & Sahoo, M. (2015). Trade Flows Between India and Other BRICS Countries: An Empirical Analysis Using Gravity Model. Global Business Review, 16(1), 107–122. https://doi.org/10.1177/0972150914553523
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CHIPS and Science Act, 117–167, U.S.. house of Representative 117th Congress (2021-2022), H.R.4346 (2022). https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346?overview=closed
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Varas, A., Varandarajan, R., Goodrich, J., & Yinug, falan. (2020). Government Incentives and US Competitiveness in Semiconductor Manufacturing. Boston Consulting Group & The Semiconductor Industry Association. https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Government-Incentives-and-US-Competitiveness-in-Semiconductor-Manufacturing-Sep-2020.pdf
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Zheng, W. (2024). China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) in Southeast Asia: Progress and Challenges. 2024.
Published
2026-06-25
How to Cite
AMALIA, Ridha et al.
China’s Digital Diplomacy and Strategic Responses to the CHIPS and Science Acts.
Insignia: Journal of International Relations, [S.l.], v. 13, n. 1, p. 53-71, june 2026.
ISSN 2597-9868.
Available at: <https://jos.unsoed.ac.id/index.php/insignia/article/view/18847>. Date accessed: 26 june 2026.
doi: https://doi.org/10.20884/1.ins.2026.13.1.18847.
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Articles
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