
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH'S (HRW) ADVOCACY STRATEGY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN MYANMAR FROM 2020 TO 2022

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KEYWORDS

Human Rights Watch (HRW), Transnational Advocacy Network (TAN), Myanmar, Human Rights, Advocacy Strategy

ABSTRACT


Myanmar is one of the countries with the worst human rights problems in the world. This human rights problem is caused by several things such as prolonged ethnic conflict and authoritarian government. Various efforts have been made by state and non-state actors to solve this problem. Human Rights Watch (HRW) is one of the actors that plays an important role in this problem. HRW itself is an NGO that plays a role in human rights advocacy. HRW's involvement in Myanmar began in 1989. This research aims to analyze the implementation of advocacy strategies carried out by HRW in Myanmar from 2020 to 2022 and their influence on human rights issues in Myanmar using the concept of transnational advocacy network (TAN). Data regarding HRW's advocacy strategy was obtained from literature studies sourced from journal articles, official reports, and online news. This study found that HRW has implemented four advocacy strategies, namely information politics, symbolic politics, influence politics, and accountability politics. However, HRW's advocacy efforts have not been able to influence Myanmar to stop the human rights problems that occur.

I. INTRODUCTION

Human rights (HAM) are universal rights inherent in all humans, not granted by anyone, be it the state or other actors. Not limited by gender, ethnicity, nation, religion, race or other status. Human rights include basic rights such as the right to life to more specific ones such as the right to work, receive education, the right to access health and freedom (OHCHR, n.d.). In International Human Rights Law it has been emphasized that the state must not interfere or limiting the fulfillment of human rights. The state is obliged to protect and facilitate the fulfillment of human rights. But in reality, the protection and fulfillment of human rights cannot be fully implemented properly.

Issues related to human rights are still one of the main problems in Southeast Asia. The diversity of cultures and political structures in Southeast Asia means that handling human rights issues is not yet fully optimal. The problems faced by countries in Southeast Asia are relatively the same, such as press freedom, religious freedom, ethnic and racial discrimination, extrajudicial killings, and issues of gender inequality (Farhan, 2022). Myanmar is a country with the worst human rights problems in Southeast Asia. Based on data from theGlobalEconomy.com, in 2022 Myanmar was ranked 9th out of 177 countries in the world as the country with the worst implementation of law and human rights (The Global Economy.com, 2022).

Graphic 1.1. Law and Human Rights Index in Myanmar



The index shows the relationship between the state and its population in terms of the protection and observance of fundamental human rights and freedom. The higher the value of index the less protected human rights and laws are in that country (TheGlobalEconomy.com, 2022). The Human Rights Watch (2019) stated that the main human rights problems in Myanmar include genocide attempt against the Rohingya ethnic group, ethnic conflict and forced displacement, freedom of expression, and disputes over land rights.

Human rights problems in Myanmar occur not because of differences in views regarding the concept of human rights or different particular human rights values. Human rights problems in Myanmar are caused by several factors such as the dominance of undemocratic military rule and the existence of discriminatory laws that target ethnic minorities such as the Rohingya. Based on the 1982 Burmese Citizenship Law, the Rohingya ethnic group is not recognized as part of Myanmar society. The Myanmar government considers the

Rohingya to be illegal immigrants so they are not responsible for fulfilling and facilitating human rights for the Rohingya. This was confirmed by former Myanmar President Thein Sein with a statement that the Rohingya were illegal immigrants who entered Myanmar so they could not be accepted. Thein Sein added that the solution to the Rohingya problem must be handled by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by providing Rohingya camps or moving Rohingya to third countries (Bauchner, 2022). Human rights problems in Myanmar worsened again in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The impact of Covid-19 in Myanmar covers various aspects, such as health and economic aspects. On the health aspect, Myanmar is experiencing difficulties in dealing with the pandemic due to the lack of adequate health facilities and medical personnel. This causes the number of cases and deaths due to Covid-19 in Myanmar to be quite high. As of January 25 2023, there have been a total of 633,814 confirmed cases of Covid-19 with a total of 19,490 deaths in Myanmar (World Health Organization, 2023). On the economic aspect, the Covid-19 pandemic has caused the tourism and trade sectors to experience significant setbacks. This causes many people who work in this sector to lose their jobs and income. Apart from that, the economic crisis caused by the pandemic has also caused the prices of basic necessities to increase and added to economic pressure on society. Based on these conditions, Myanmar's gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2022 is estimated to be 13% lower than in 2019 (THE WORLD BANK, 2022).

The Myanmar government prevents almost all Rohingya from obtaining citizenship, making them vulnerable to becoming victims of human rights violations. In addition, the Myanmar government has blocked access to humanitarian aid from international organizations. Aid agencies report difficulties in distributing aid due to regulations made by the Myanmar Government. The Myanmar government has tightened access to mobilization with aid, requiring aid distribution officers to apply for travel authorization every month (HRW, 2020).

The worsening human rights problems in Myanmar increased when the Myanmar Military Junta carried out a coup against the new government as a result of the election on November 8 2020. Reporting from Reuters (2021), on February 1 2021 there were detentions of Myanmar Advisor Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar President Win Myint, and several senior figures from the National League for Democracy (NLD) Party. This coup occurred due to

the military's suspicion of election fraud or cheating in the general election carried out by the NLD (Reuters, 2021). This accusation of fraud is not confirmed by the Union Election Commission of Myanmar (UECM) as the election authority body in Myanmar. UECM emphasized via its official Facebook page that although there were several errors and shortcomings in the November 8 2021 election, this did not affect the results of the election. The election was still declared to have run smoothly and legally (Reuters, 2021).

Based on data collected by The Committee for Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), an organization that represents the government elected based on the election, as of April 7 2021 they have collected 180,000 pieces of evidence of human rights violations committed by the Myanmar Military Junta, which included hundreds of extra-judicial executions, torture and illegal detention (CRPH quoted by Ratcliffe, 2021). Other data from the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) states that there are at least 3,054 people in detention, including politicians, pro-democracy activists, human rights defenders, and journalists. AAPP data also shows that 714 people died in acts of violence committed by security forces as of April 13 2021. Apart from this, the Myanmar Military Junta also cut off communication access, namely the internet. Amnesty International added that the Myanmar military apparatus systematically used tactics and weapons normally used on the battlefield. If this incident continues, of course this will worsen the humanitarian crisis occurring in Myanmar and its peak could result in civil war and Myanmar risks becoming a failed state (AAPP quoted In Hamid, 2021). The escalation of vertical conflict between the Myanmar Military Junta and society is also increasing. The Myanmar Military Junta also arrested and shot medical personnel; the government considered that medical personnel were part of the civil disobedience movement who opposed the power of the Myanmar Military Junta (Myanmar Now, 2021). Based on data from UNHCR as of July 27 2021, the Myanmar Military Junta has carried out at least 931 murders, 5630 arbitrary arrests and 255 arrests on false charges. Of the 255 people arrested, 26 people, including 2 minors, were sentenced to death, and there are at least 570,320 refugees currently in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, Shin, Kayin, Mon and Bago (OHCHR, 2021).

The conditions in Myanmar show the failure of Myanmar as a country that should protect and facilitate the fulfillment of human rights, but instead becomes an actor who commits violations against the fulfillment of human rights. This makes society need other actors to

help it in the process of fulfilling human rights. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) or International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGO) are one of the actors that play an important role in the process of fulfilling human rights. NGOs are non-profit organizations that aim to serve the interests of society by focusing on advocacy or operational actions for social, political and economic goals, including equality, health and human rights protection. NGOs are also called organizations that are manifestations of civil society's interests (Teegen et al., 2004). Based on their movement patterns, NGOs are divided into two categories, namely advocacy and operational. NGOs in the advocacy category are NGOs that act as representatives of communities that do not have a voice or access to voice their interests. In carrying out their advocacy role, NGOs use various efforts such as lobbying, acting as experts or experts and advisors, conducting research, holding conferences, monitoring and exposing the actions of other actors, holding public trials, sharing information with key constituents, forming agendas or carrying out boycotts. Meanwhile, what is meant by operational is an NGO that provides important goods and services for those in need (Teegen, Doh, & Vachani, 2004).

AAPP is one of the local NGOs in Myanmar which is very vocal in voicing and advocating human rights issues in Myanmar. AAPP's important roles include: monitoring, collecting and sharing accurate data on political prisoners with the public; providing legal assistance to political prisoners; and carrying out public advocacy through the media with its campaigns (AAPP, n.d.). In carrying out its advocacy, AAPP faces several challenges such as: limited access and information, this is caused by restrictions imposed by the Myanmar Military Junta; limited resources, both financial and human; Apart from that, AAPP also received threats and intimidation from the Myanmar Military Junta (Andrea & Minami, 2021). These things complicate the human rights advocacy process in Myanmar. Therefore, AAPP collaborates with INGOs to strengthen human rights advocacy that can be carried out.

One of the INGOs that plays an active role in helping AAPP in the human rights advocacy process in Myanmar is HRW. Several forms of collaboration between AAPP and HRW include joint investigations, joint advocacy, and reporting. In addition, HRW also provides support through training programs (AAPP, 2014). HRW's involvement in the advocacy process for resolving human rights violations began in 1898, when at that time it was still

called Asia Watch. Asia Watch is actively involved in human rights advocacy in Myanmar by conducting pressure on the United States at that time to impose sanctions on Myanmar (Human Rights Watch, 1989). Until now, HRW is still actively involved in human rights advocacy in Myanmar. This can be seen through the annual report prepared by HRW. Based on this background, this research will discuss the analysis of HRW's advocacy strategy in resolving human rights violations in Myanmar in 2020-2022. This article will discuss **Human Rights Watch's advocacy strategy regarding resolving human rights problems in Myanmar in 2020-2022.**

II. METHOD

The article uses qualitative research methods because the research objective of this research is to make facts or phenomena easy to understand (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2020: 10). The type of research that the author will use is descriptive qualitative research, where this research will attempt to provide a systematic, accurate and factual general description of a fact, the nature and relationship between the phenomena studied (Nazir, 2014:14). In this research, descriptive qualitative methods are used to explain the role of Human Rights Watch in its efforts to enforce human rights in the coup case carried out by the Tatmadaw in Myanmar in 2021-2022. This research used library study techniques using literature such as books, journal articles, news, printed or online reports related to the role of Human Rights Watch in resolving cases of human rights violations resulting from the Tatmadaw coup in Myanmar.

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an NGO that focuses on conducting research and advocacy related to human rights. HRW was founded in 1978, when at the beginning HRW was called Helsinki Watch. The establishment of Helsinki Watch was to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki Accords, which were signed by the United States and other Western countries as well as the Soviet Union and its allies. In the mid-1970s, a group of American activists and scientists became concerned about human rights violations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This prompted them to establish the Helsinki Accords Committee in 1976 to monitor the implementation of the Helsinki Accord Final Act (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). In 1978, the Helsinki Accord Committee formed Helsinki Watch, an NGO whose focus was to monitor and report human rights violations

in the Soviet Union bloc countries. The organization is named Helsinki Watch after the Helsinki Final Act and is funded by private donations. Helsinki Watch's initial staff consisted of volunteers who traveled to the region to document human rights violations (HRW, n.d.).

Helsinki Watch's activities focused on documenting human rights violations in Soviet bloc countries, including arbitrary detention, torture, and the suppression of freedom of speech, religion, and association. The organization also provides aid and support to dissidents and human rights activists in the region. Helsinki Watch played a key role in exposing human rights violations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Its reports and publications brought attention to the situation in the region and helped generate international pressure on governments to improve their human rights records. Helsinki Watch also provided a platform for dissidents and activists to share their stories and experiences, which helped build support for the human rights movement in the region (Sklar, 1985).

Helsinki Watch is considered successful in being a pioneer in the human rights activism movement by making a major contribution to democratization in the 1980s. The success of Helsinki Watch sparked the growth of human rights activism movements in other countries such as the United States with Americas Watch. In 1981 Americas Watch was formed, relying on extensive fact-finding on the ground, Americas Watch not only handled violations committed by the government, but also they played an important role in the investigative process to uncover war crimes committed by rebel groups using the rules of humanitarian law. In addition to voicing concerns in affected countries, Americas Watch also critically examines the role played by foreign governments, particularly the United States, in providing military and political support to violent regimes. Sequentially in the 1980s, Asia Watch (1985), Africa Watch (1988), and Middle East Watch (1989) were added to what became known as "The Watch Committees." In 1988, the organization officially adopted the full name Human Rights Watch. (HRW, n.d.). New challenges in human rights activism emerged in the 1990s, prompting important innovations in HRW's work. His report on the Persian Gulf War of 1991 for the first time discussed violations of the laws of war in the bombing campaign. Advocacy targets expanded to give greater attention to the United Nations and regional bodies such as the European Union. The genocide in Rwanda and the Balkans prompted the need for first-hand reporting of

atrocities and in-depth case documentation to push for the first international prosecutions in the 1990s. HRW has supported and criticized international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, called for the prosecution of violent leaders including Augusto Pinochet of Chile and Hissene Habre of Chad, and played a leading role in the drafting of the Rome Statute to establish the International Criminal Court (HRW, n.d.). At the same time, HRW expanded and strengthened its movement on the rights of women, children, refugees, and migrant workers, bringing a human rights perspective to issues such as domestic violence, human trafficking, rape as a war crime, and child soldiers. HRW finds new ways to investigate human rights violations in closed societies like Saudi Arabia and North Korea. This helps shine a light on previously overlooked topics such as the rights of LGBTQ people. HRW researches the international arms trade and the role of business in human rights, producing groundbreaking studies, for example, on rights abuses in the oil, gold, and meatpacking industries. In 1997 HRW shared the Nobel peace prize as a founding member of the International Campaign to ban land mines, and played a leading role in the 2008 cluster bomb ban treaty (HRW, n.d.).

Human Rights Watch uses several methods to obtain data to support the advocacy process. HRW conducts independent research through field investigations, interviews and other data collection. HRW has experienced and trained research staff, who work to verify and validate information, investigate and compare data sources, and integrate data from various sources (Gregory, 2006). Apart from that, HRW also uses new technology and methodology in data collection. For example, they use bomb data analysis to examine the feasibility of military attacks and conduct mapping to identify locations of human rights violations. HRW uses increasingly sophisticated technology, including the use of satellite photography and geographic mapping, to identify the locations of human rights violations and determine responsibility for those violations. HRW also uses the latest statistical and data methods in data collection, thus strengthening their arguments in advocacy (Broomley, 2009).

Apart from going directly into the field, HRW also follows relevant developments in their advocacy process through the media, results from similar organizations and the research community, as well as ongoing communication with trusted contacts in the local activist community. HRW's research is not just about victims and perpetrators, but about

determining who can and should be held responsible to stop human rights violations and provide redress, the detailed and specific steps they need to take, and who else can provide influence and responsibility. This is done by HRW to keep their data credible. Several procedures in research methods carried out by HRW include: (1) initial research, (2) interview research: location, (3) interview research: who we interview, (4) interview research: how we conduct interviews with victims/witnesses, (5) non-interview research (HRW, 2009).

HRW Advocacy Strategy Matrix in Myanmar for 2020-2022

Strategy	2020-2022
<i>Information politics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publish an Annual Report (World Report) on the condition of Human Rights in Myanmar • Documenting the conditions of Rohingya people who are living in refugee camps • Published 62 news stories related to human rights developments in Myanmar • Reports regarding the massacre of anti-coup protesters in Yangon or “March Massacre” • Published 98 news stories related to human rights developments in Myanmar • Published videos of violence against demonstrators used by the Myanmar military • Published a report entitled No One is Spared which explains the impact of violence experience by parents as a result of armed conflict • Published 52 news related to human rights developments in Myanmar
<i>Symbolic politics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involved in the Red Ribbon Campaign • Involved in the Three Fingers Salutation Movement
<i>Leverage politics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pressure OHCHR to take firm steps against human right violations committed by Myanmar • Urge Canada and Japan to strengthen advocacy for the Rohingya and stop collaborating with Junta-controlled companies • Urge the UN Secretary General to include Myanmar on ‘the list of shame’ • Pressure the European Union and G7 to impose sanctions on MEHL and MEC companies • Pressure Australia to immediately impose sanctions targeting the individuals or companies involved with the Myanmar Junta

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pressure Japan to stop military cooperation with Myanmar • Pressure multinational energy companies to stop payments to MOGE which is a source of funds for the Myanmar Junta • Pressure the UNHRC to ask all UN members to implement an arms embargo on Myanmar • Pressure the European Union and ASEAN to strengthen cooperation and advocacy in addressing human rights problems in Myanmar.
<i>Accountability politics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pressure Myanmar to continue its commitment to implementation of the 2015 UPR • Pressing Myanmar's commitment to implementation ICJ decision in 2020.

From 2020 to 2022 HRW has implemented all advocacy strategies in accordance with the TAN concept according to Keck and Sikkink (1998). The strategies most frequently used by HRW are information politics and leverage politics. The use of this strategy is intended as an effort to increase urgency so that the issue in Myanmar becomes a priority in international discussions. Apart from that, using this strategy is also an effective way to put pressure on the Myanmar Junta.

Based on the TAN concept, there are several stages of influence which we can group into five stages: (1) issue formation and agenda setting; (2) influence on the discursive position of countries or international organizations; (3) influence on international procedures; (4) influence on policy changes taken by “target actors”; (5) influence on state behavior (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

The first stage, issue formation and agenda setting, is said to be achieved when the issue being raised triggers media attention, debate and discussion on an issue that previously received little attention. In this case, it could be said that the influence of the advocacy strategy implemented by HRW has reached the stage First. HRW's political information strategy has brought this issue to international attention. Many discussions have been held in addressing this issue, such as discussions held by the UN Human Rights Council which issued a resolution to immediately implement the UN's human rights mechanisms in resolving human rights violations. The publication of news about incidents of human rights violations in Myanmar in international media such as BBC, CNN, Reuters and other media. Apart from that, the framing carried out by HRW using the word atrocities also has an impact on the way the international community views the Myanmar Junta. The

international community sees the Junta as a tyrant who will do anything to maintain his power. This political information strategy has also succeeded in triggering the emergence of international community solidarity movements, such as the growth of transnational activist movements such as the Milk Tea Alliance, which is one proof of the achievement of this first stage.

The second stage, influence on the discursive position of countries and international organizations. At this stage, the issues raised can persuade countries or international organizations to support international declarations with the aim of changing the domestic policies of the target actor. The influence of HRW's advocacy strategy has reached this stage, we can see how HRW is influencing countries to implement an arms embargo, and impose economic sanctions on Myanmar. We can see evidence of success at this stage from the response of international actors.

On January 21 2022, the French company Total Energies responded in support of an open letter from HRW to impose sanctions on Myanmar. Total Energies stopped all ongoing projects with Myanmar and also restricted the flow of funds received by MOGE. The aim of sanctions from Total Energies is to suppress or reduce the intensity of human rights violations committed by the Myanmar Junta. Apart from Total Energies, other actors such as countries also support the open letter from HRW. The United States and European countries are using sanctions as part of their support response. The first US sanctions were imposed just 10 days after the coup. Since then, the United States has imposed nearly 20 rounds of sanctions on Myanmar, targeting military leaders, their families, military-linked business entities, state-owned companies, arms brokers and aviation fuel suppliers. The announcement of the sanctions coincided with the anniversary of the coup and other international events, such as International Human Rights Day. The European Union and Britain have also imposed several rounds of sanctions. The European Union's restrictive measures, imposed in six separate rounds of sanctions, apply to 93 individuals and 18 entities, while the UK has imposed sanctions on 34 individuals and 27 entities. Australia, Canada and New Zealand have also imposed some sanctions. The imposition of sanctions against Myanmar did not have a significant impact on reducing human rights violations in Myanmar. On April 11 2023 Myanmar launched the deadliest air attack since the Junta came to power which killed 168 people in Pa Zi Gyi, Sagaing (Ratcliffe, 2023). The

implementation of these sanctions will not be effective because there is still diplomatic support from Russia and China, both of which are permanent members of the UN Security Council who will veto resolutions on sanctions or arms embargoes. China is Myanmar's main economic partner and source of investment, while Russia is an increasingly important supplier of military equipment, including aircraft (Patton, 2023). The impact of these sanctions is felt more strongly by Myanmar's civil society. Based on data from World Economics, Myanmar's annual GDP growth experienced a significant decline from 3.2% in 2020 to -17.9% in 2021, and began to improve in 2022 to 2% (World Economics, 2023). In addition, these sanctions trigger increases in food and fuel prices. Myanmar's currency, the Kyat, experienced a 31% devaluation against the US Dollar (Reuters, 2023). The unemployment rate in 2021 in Myanmar also increased by 1.12% from 2020 to 2.17% (Marcrotrends, 2023).

Although sanctions have been imposed on Myanmar in response to the military coup and human rights violations. This does not stop the Myanmar Junta from committing human rights violations. This ineffectiveness is because sanctions are not implemented by all countries. Countries such as China and Russia still collaborate with companies controlled by the Junta. To overcome this, a legally binding joint agreement is needed to impose global sanctions on Myanmar.

The third stage, there is influence on institutional procedures. When this stage has been reached, we can see how HRW's strategy influenced the Myanmar Military Junta to take the decision to establish a procedure for returning Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to return to Myanmar called the 'Pilot' program. A 'pilot' repatriation project is a program that aims to return a small group of refugees or illegal immigrants to their country of origin as a trial before larger scale repatriation efforts are undertaken. This repatriation pilot project was implemented in the context of the Rohingya refugee crisis. This repatriation program is the result of bilateral cooperation between Bangladesh and Myanmar, mediated by China. In total there are 1,140 Rohingya people who will later be repatriated, of which 711 people have completed the process of collecting data on identity and origin and 479 other people are still in the data collection process (The Diplomat, 2023). This repatriation program actually shows good faith from the Myanmar Junta to restore human rights to the

Rohingya ethnic group because with this program Myanmar is trying to show efforts to improve human rights conditions in its country.

This program is not the right solution and allegedly will not work effectively. This takes into consideration how conditions in Myanmar, especially Rakhine, are not yet conducive and feasible for the return of Rohingya. Especially after seeing the aggressive actions of the Myanmar Junta in carrying out air attacks that killed civilians in Pa Zi Gyi, Sagaing. Apart from that, another consideration is to see China's involvement as a mediator in this repatriation program. Researchers see China's involvement in repatriation as being carried out not in the interests of the Rohingya ethnic group but in China's own national interests. The majority of Rohingya refugees come from the northern region of Rakhine which is close to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) area, which is an infrastructure project area that connects China's Yunnan Province with Myanmar (The Diplomat, 2023). Another thing is the history of human rights violations committed by China against the ethnic minority group, namely the Uighurs, which makes China unsuitable as a mediator in this repatriation program. This repatriation program should be implemented when conditions in the area of origin are safe and conducive and refugees are willing to be repatriated. Apart from that, the repatriation program should be mediated by a country that is neutral and has no history of committing human rights violations. In order for this program to run effectively, it also requires strict supervision from other countries and international institutions.

The fourth stage, changes in the target actor's policies. This stage has not been reached, seeing that until now Myanmar has not yet made changes to policies that are restrictive, discriminatory and do not comply with international human rights standards. The proof is that we can see how there have been no significant changes made by Myanmar in responding to recommendations from the 2015 UPR, such as not having ratified human rights conventions (ICCPR, ICERD, CAT, etc.). Myanmar has also not implemented temporary measures as ordered by the ICJ in its decision on January 23 2020, namely:

- a) Make all efforts to prevent genocide;
- b) Ensure that the military as well as all armed groups, organizations or individuals under its influence and support do not carry out genocide efforts;
- c) Prevent and ensure the security of evidence related to allegations of attempted genocide;

- d) Send a report to the ICJ regarding all actions taken regarding genocide allegations every six months.

Apart from that, Myanmar has also not revised its domestic policies such as the 1982 Citizenship Law, the 2013 Telecommunications Law, and the 2011 Law on Peaceful Assemblies and Demonstrations even though they have received criticism from international parties. Myanmar too. The main factor causing no change in Myanmar's policy is the non-collective actions of the international community, where several countries such as China and Russia do not try to take a firm stance towards Myanmar regarding its human rights violations. China and Russia even seem to allow these human rights violations to continue to occur by continuing to collaborate with Myanmar. The fifth stage, influence on state behavior.

Looking at the conditions until 2022, it is clear that the fifth stage has not been achieved. The proof is, even though it has received an embargo, sanctions and criticism from the international community, until now Myanmar has not shown any seriousness in enforcing the human rights problems that occur (HRW, 2023). Despite the international community's efforts to resolve the situation in Myanmar, the military junta continues to commit human rights violations. heavy man with impunity. The following are some of the reasons why international pressure has had almost no effect on Myanmar:

- a) Lack of unity: The international community is not united in its approach to Myanmar, with some countries imposing sanctions and others not. This lack of unity weakened the impact of international pressure on the military junta.
- b) External support: Myanmar's military has access to advanced weapons systems, spare parts for fighter jets, raw materials, and manufacturing equipment for domestic weapons production, supplied by foreign companies.
- c) The military junta also has the support of China and Russia, who have veto power in the UN Security Council and can block any meaningful action against Myanmar. Companies from 13 countries, including France, Germany, China, India, Russia, Singapore and the United States, have provided "critical" supplies for weapons production in Myanmar. Russia, China, Singapore, India and Thailand are the main suppliers to Myanmar's military, according to a 10-month investigation by a United Nations-linked body. The companies mentioned above supply Myanmar's military with

raw materials, training, and machinery, and the weapons produced are not used to defend its borders. Israel's CAA Industries.Ltd also sells equipment used to upgrade Myanmar's military small arms. Despite international sanctions, Myanmar has ramped up its arms industry, and local factories are still able to take advantage of licensed technology and overseas supply chains, technical support, and other support (Al Jazeera, 2023)

- d) Domestic support: The military junta still enjoys support from some segments of the population, especially among the majority Bamar ethnic community. This support allows the military to maintain its grip on power despite international pressure.
- e) Failure of the international community: The international community's response to the crisis in Myanmar failed, and that failure has contributed to a deadly decline that is destroying the lives of millions of people. The international community needs to take more effective steps to address the situation in Myanmar. In conclusion, the situation in Myanmar remains ongoing and urgent global action is needed to protect the Myanmar people and hold the military junta accountable for their actions. The international community needs to work together to put more effective pressure on the military junta and support the Myanmar people in their struggle for democracy and human rights.

IV. CONCLUSION

In this research we can see that actions taken by non-state actors can influence the decision-making process of a country or international organization. Human Rights Watch has implemented various strategies in the advocacy process regarding human rights violations in Myanmar in 2020-2022.

Based on an analysis of the advocacy strategy carried out by HRW in upholding human rights in Myanmar in 2020-2022 using the TAN concept. HRW has used four advocacy strategies based on the TAN concept. Information politics and symbolic politics in building issues and attracting public attention regarding human rights violations in Myanmar through the publication of annual reports and news about the condition of human rights in Myanmar as well as involvement in red tape actions. Pressuring Myanmar using political leverage. HRW uses accountability politics to continue to remind Myanmar of their agreement to resolve their human rights problems through the agreement in the 2015 UPR. The strategies most frequently used by HRW are information politics and leverage politics. The use of this strategy is intended as an effort to increase urgency so that the issue in

Myanmar becomes a priority in international discussions. Apart from that, using this strategy is also an effective way to put pressure on the Myanmar Junta. In HRW's advocacy efforts, we can also see a boomerang pattern occurring, from how local NGOs such as AAPP, Mekong Watch, and others use information submitted to HRW to put pressure on Myanmar.

Based on the five stages of influence in the TAN concept, such as: issue formation and agenda setting, influence on the discursive position of states or international organizations, influence on international procedures, influence on policy changes taken by "target actors", and influence on state behavior. The influence of the advocacy strategies carried out by HRW has reached stage three, namely changes to international procedures. This can be seen from how HRW's strategy influenced the Myanmar Military Junta to take the decision to establish a procedure for returning Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to return to Myanmar, called the 'Pilot' program. Meanwhile, the fourth and fifth stages, namely policy changes and changes in state behavior, have not been achieved. Although sanctions have been imposed on Myanmar in response to the military coup and human rights violations. This does not stop the Myanmar Junta from committing human rights violations. The factor that caused there to be no change in policy from Myanmar was the non-collective actions of the international community, where several countries such as China and Russia did not try to take a firm stance towards Myanmar regarding its human rights violations. Hence there is no firm response from ASEAN as a regional organization in pressuring Myanmar to stop its human rights violations.

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