

Historicity of the National *Santri* Day

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Abstract: This article discusses the establishment of National *Santri* Day, which was created through Presidential Decree No. 22 of 2015. The date refers to the event of the Jihad Resolution declared by *Kiai* across Java and Madura in 1945, under the influence of President Soekarno, to assist the Indonesian people in their struggle for independence. Seventy years later, the value of the Jihad Resolution was revisited and institutionalized into the tradition of National *Santri* Day. The legalization of National *Santri* Day raises an important question regarding its timing. This research employs a qualitative method by analyzing texts related to the historicity of National *Santri* Day to examine the background and underlying factors behind the establishment of National *Santri* Day, with an emphasis on its residual, emergent, and dominant cultural aspects. The findings of this study reveal that the values of struggle and the collective trauma toward radicalism in Indonesia are utilized as residual elements preserved by the dominant authority as a means of legitimizing its power during the new governmental period in 2014.

Keywords: National *Santri* Day; Historicity; Raymond Williams; Residual–Emergent–Dominant.

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Introduction

Based on Article 28E paragraph (1) of the 1945 constitution, every person in Indonesia has the right to embrace a religion and to worship according to that religion. Article 29, paragraph (2) further guarantees citizens' freedom to practice their faith. Meanwhile, Article 22 of the Human Rights Law regulates freedom of religion and belief. Among the many belief systems in Indonesia, the state recognizes only six for official inclusion on national identity cards, based on

Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 on the Prevention of the Misuse and/or Blasphemy of Religion. These are Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Of these six, Islam has become the dominant faith that moves and shapes the social fabric of Indonesian society. In fact, within Article 1 of the PNPS Law, Islam is mentioned as the first recognized religion in Indonesia. Time by time, among its population, Islam has developed into a lifestyle continually reproduced across generations. One of the enduring Islamic cultural practices is the *santri* tradition.

The term *santri* itself does not originate from Arabic. There are three main theories concerning its etymology. The first derives from the Sanskrit word *santri*, meaning “literate.” C.C. Berg interprets *santri* as a person who possesses knowledge of Hindu sacred texts. The second theory traces *santri* to the Javanese word *cantrik*, meaning “a disciple who follows a teacher wherever the teacher goes or resides.” Another scholar, A. H. John, suggests that *santri* comes from the Tamil word meaning “Qur’an teacher” (Dhofier, 1994). Zamakhsyari Dhofier, in *Tradisi Pesantren*, defines a *santri* as a student who studies at a (1994). However, the identity of a *santri* is lifelong—being a *santri* also means engaging in an unending process of learning and teaching throughout one’s life (Baso, 2005). *Santri* learn from *Kiai*, a person who leads the *pesantren*. According to Goncing (2015), a *Kiai* is the guardian of faith and a spiritual teacher who holds absolute authority in providing religious knowledge, including fiqh, tauhid, Arabic, and muamalah. A common custom among *santri* is to kiss the hand of a *kiai* when they meet, symbolizing both respect for hierarchical difference and a hope for divine blessing. Obedience to the *Kiai*’s will is regarded as a source of spiritual merit that can lead to salvation in the afterlife (Gufron, 2019). Dormitories for *santri* are typically located within the *pesantren* complex, near the residence of the *kiai* (Herman, 2013).

The *pesantren* grew in the Walisongo period. Historically, the Walisongo spread Islam among communities that practiced animism, dynamism, and Hindu-Buddhist traditions. They adapted Islamic teachings to local wisdom and culture. Over time, Islamic centers grew around *surau* or mosques, eventually institutionalized into *pondok pesantren* (Musthofa, 2015). In its development, the form, system, and method of *pesantren* in Indonesia can be divided into two major periods: the Ampel (salaf) period, characterized by comprehensive simplicity, and the Gontor period, characterized by modernity in system, method, and architecture. This division does not negate the existence of earlier *pesantren*. Before Ampel, the *pesantren* established by Sheikh Maulana Malik Ibrahim already existed. Similarly, before Gontor, there were pioneering institutions such as *Pesantren Thawalib* in Sumatra, which served as precursors to modern *pesantren* like Gontor. The distinction between these two types is based on their significant historical influence on Islamic education in Indonesia (Ferdinan, 2018).

Santri, as an integral element of the *pesantren*, are recognized by society as individuals capable of applying religious knowledge in their communities after completing their studies. In rural areas, *santri* are often entrusted with leading local religious traditions. This trust has historically encouraged *santri* to assume leadership roles—not only as religious figures but also as community leaders such as village heads and other local administrators.

The *santri*'s role extends beyond local communities to the national level. Organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Ahmadiyah played significant roles in Indonesia's struggle for independence. In 1913, KH Hasyim Asy'ari, leader of Pesantren Tebuireng, issued a fatwa prohibiting Indonesian Muslims from joining the Dutch army (Yuliah, 2012). Later, on 21–22 October 1945, the Jihad Resolution was declared, an initiative that originated when President Soekarno sent envoys to consult KH Hasyim Asy'ari on the religious legitimacy of defending Indonesia's independence. On September 16, 1945, Hasyim Asy'ari affirmed that it was a religious obligation for Indonesian Muslims to defend their homeland against foreign threats (Bizawie, 2014).

This Jihad Resolution later became the basis for commemorating National *Santri* Day, officially established by President Joko Widodo in 2015. After seventy years, this commemoration was formalized through Presidential Decree No. 22 of 2015. This raises important questions: what motivated the President's decision? What is the significance of National *Santri* Day, celebrated annually by Muslim students across Indonesia? Drawing on Raymond Williams's theory, dominant groups are willing to employ various means to legitimize their agenda, including, in this case, the mobilization of collective trauma to justify contemporary political decisions. This article aims to explain the background, form of commemoration, and functions of National *Santri* Day as observed each year in Indonesia.

Methods

The method used to address the research questions in this article is a qualitative approach through library research. The primary data for this study include Presidential Decree No. 22 of 2015, the President's speech delivered on October 22, 2015, and documentation of the National *Santri* Day march. The analysis is conducted through a contextual approach and relies solely on theoretical interpretation, without empirical data support. Data analysis is conducted using Raymond Williams's theoretical framework, which discusses residual, emergent, and dominant cultural forms to examine social phenomena.

The residual refers to cultural elements originating from the past that persist in the present, albeit in varied forms. Experiences, meanings, and values that cannot be fully articulated or substantiated within the dominant culture continue to be lived and practiced through these residual elements. The residual holds a position that is strongly influenced by the dominant forces. It is maintained because it still carries cultural and political functions.

Meanwhile, the emergent represents new meanings, forms, and social relations that arise within a specific cultural period as a result of the interaction between the dominant power—which controls and regulates—and the residual, which seeks to endure or be preserved (Williams, 1977).

Results

Collective Memory of the Jihad Resolution

Presidential Decree No. 22 of 2015 designates October 22 as National *Santri* Day. The decree was signed on October 15, 2015. This date refers to the Jihad Resolution proclaimed by KH

Hasyim Asy'ari, calling upon *santri* to fight for the nation. The presidential considerations for establishing National *Santri* Day are outlined in three main points: a. The ulama and *santri* of *pondok pesantren* have played significant roles in the struggle to gain and defend the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as in nation-building. In order to commemorate, emulate, and continue the contributions of *ulama* and *santri* in defending and maintaining the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia while contributing to national development, it is necessary to designate *Santri* Day on October 22. October 22 refers to the date when the Jihad Resolution was declared in 1945 by ulama and *santri* from various regions of Indonesia, obligating every Muslim to defend the homeland and safeguard the independence of the Republic of Indonesia from colonial forces.

All three points highlight the same core idea: that National *Santri* Day institutionalizes the collective memory of the Jihad Resolution initiated by Soekarno in 1945. According to Gufron (2019), at that time, the Indonesian people—still under colonial rule—were inspired by KH Hasyim Asy'ari's religious decree that defending the newly independent nation was both a national duty and a religious obligation. For Indonesians, independence was not only a political aspiration but also a religious imperative. Thus, the nationalism fostered by *santri* and ulama can be understood as a collective awareness that striving for national freedom is itself an act of faith and devotion in Islam.

Although the individuals who participated in the Jihad Resolution are no longer alive, the religious communities and organizations connected to these figures continue to preserve their memory. Halbwachs (1992) notes that collective memory can be reactivated through the social groups that embody and sustain it.

Historically, beyond its commemorative purpose of honoring the Jihad Resolution and expressing gratitude, it is essential to examine the broader context surrounding the issuance of the Presidential Decree. Why did neither President Soekarno nor President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) initiate such a commemoration? Referring to President Joko Widodo's speech published by the Indonesian Cabinet Secretariat (Pidato Presiden RI Pada Hari Santri Nasional Di Masjid Jakarta, 2015), he stated that, through this decree, it is hoped that:

"...santri will always remember to continue their jihad for the nation, for the homeland, for our beloved Indonesia, and to always strive for the welfare and justice of all Indonesian people."

(<https://setkab.go.id/pidato-presiden-ri-pada-deklarasi-hari-santri-nasiona-di-masjid-istiqlal-jakarta-22-oktober-2015/>)

This statement suggests that the commemoration of National *Santri* Day serves as a moral reminder for contemporary *santri* to continue their "jihad" for the homeland. The pronoun "our" following "Indonesia" subtly constructs a sense of ownership and belonging—implying that the nation's identity must be consciously maintained and reaffirmed.

In March 2015, the Indonesian National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas) published a journal titled Enhancing the Mitigation of Radicalism to Establish a National Security System for National Resilience. The journal discusses the dangers of radicalism in Indonesia, referencing past incidents such as the Madiun/PKI (1948), DI/TII (1949), and the September 30 Movement

(1965). It also warns of the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), whose influence had reached Indonesia. The Ministry of Defense thus took decisive steps to prevent radicalization from undermining the national ideology. One of the most relevant recommendations in the journal reads:

"It is recommended to take more comprehensive and concrete measures, including:

a. Ideological aspect: Religious leaders, under the coordination of the Minister of Religious Affairs, should establish a shared commitment and understanding concerning religious radical ideologies, so that the public will have no hesitation in their worship and the radical groups can be isolated within their own environments, thereby facilitating the deradicalization process." (Salamuddin, 2015).

The discussion of radical groups in Indonesia remains ongoing and unresolved. The meaning of "radical" has also undergone a significant transformation. In its denotative sense, radical means "to the root" — to think radically is to think deeply and fundamentally. However, when combined with the term Islam, forming "radical Islam," it acquires a new, socially agreed meaning—an active, threatening force, especially within Indonesia's sociopolitical context.

The history of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia spans several eras. Before the Reformation period, radical Islamic movements were largely framed as resistance to capitalism and Islamic hegemony itself. In the contemporary period, however, Islamic radicalism is primarily viewed through a political lens. Political radical Islamists use religious symbols to justify their movements. In practice, they often frame their activities as religious dakwah (propagation) rather than as political or structural movements (Solihin, 2017).

During the Old Order era, Kartosuwiryo declared Darul Islam (DI/TII) as a movement to establish an Islamic State of Indonesia. Rebellions under DI/TII erupted in various provinces, including South Sulawesi. The movement's goal was to create an Islamic state governed by sharia. However, this movement became a serious threat to Indonesia's newly established republic. President Soekarno attempted to suppress it, and by 1947, DI/TII was officially banned (Bruinessen, 2013).

Following DI/TII, acts of terrorism in Indonesia became increasingly associated with radical Islam. The global terrorist network Al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, extended its influence into Southeast Asia, supporting local networks such as Jemaah Islamiyah, which carried out the Bali bombing on October 12, 2002, killing more than 200 people (Solihin, 2017).

Public fear of Islamic radicalism resurfaced in 2014. Since the New Order, several organizations have been classified as radical, including Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), and Laskar Jihad (LJ) (Rokhmad, 2014). A 2016 journal article discussing HTI's vision of the Khilafah (Islamic Caliphate) argues that Hizbut Tahrir believes that the implementation of sharia can only be realized through an Islamic Caliphate (Daulah Khilafah Islamiyah) (Arifin, 2010). Consequently, HTI's Dakwah Al-Islam bulletins often contain calls for the establishment of a caliphate (Shofwan, 2016).

Hikam (2018), in the Journal of Defense and State Security, compiled data on terrorist acts motivated by radical movements in Indonesia. He notes that post-Reformation radical narratives often feature themes such as anti-NKRI (anti-Unitary State of Indonesia), anti-government (thaghut), and pro-Islamic state or caliphate movements. Hikam identifies two dominant radical currents: (1) groups sympathizing with or affiliated to ISIS, and (2) groups linked to the transnational Hizbut Tahrir network.

He summarizes several incidents as follows:

- a. Terror attack on Thamrin Street (January 14, 2016);
- b. Suicide bombing at Surakarta Police Headquarters (July 5, 2016) by Jamaah Anshar Daulah Khilafah Nusantara (JADKN) led by Bahrin Naim, an Indonesian ISIS member;
- c. Bombing in Kampung Melayu (May 24, 2017) by the ISIS-affiliated JAD group;
- d. Planned terror attack on August 17, 2015, in Solo;
- e. Arrest of the Majalengka terrorist network in Tangerang Selatan (November 2016);
- f. Arrests in Serpong, Payakumbuh, and Deli Serdang (December 2016).

Residual, Emergent, and Dominant

The collective fear of the resurgence of radical Islam has been widely responded to by the Muslim majority in Indonesia through proactive rejection of all forms of radical movements. The mainstream Islamic community—predominantly represented by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and other major Islamic organizations across the archipelago—has consistently rejected khilafah-oriented and violent movements (Azra, 2014). This resistance became especially visible in 2017, when NU Chairman Said Aqil Siradj and Muhammadiyah Secretary-General Abdul Mu'ti held a joint discussion concerning the dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Both leaders agreed that the dissolution was legitimate, as the movement was considered a threat to Pancasila (Medistiara, 2014).

This sociopolitical climate was strategically utilized by the Jokowi–JK (Joko Widodo–Jusuf Kalla) campaign team in 2014 to attract the support of the Muslim majority. During that period, Jokowi pledged to establish a National *Santri* Day, proposed initially for 1 Muharram. According to Antara News (Khairany (2014) on June 28), Jokowi stated during a campaign dialogue at Pondok Pesantren Babussalam, Malang, East Java:

“A mental revolution must be carried out. I believe that pesantren plays a crucial role in this mental revolution. The pesantren are the key. Therefore, I agree to the proposal for establishing a National Santri Day.”

As promised, once elected President, Jokowi fulfilled this commitment by formalizing National *Santri* Day, referring to the date of the Jihad Resolution in 1945—October 22. The selection of this date represents a residual cultural element: a continuation of past values reflecting the ideological strength of Islam in shaping Indonesia's independence within the framework of Pancasila, as envisioned by Soekarno. The authority and influence of *Kiai* within the Jihad Resolution demonstrated the power of religious leadership in mobilizing the masses through spiritual conviction.

These residual elements, including the collective trauma surrounding radicalism, have been effectively reappropriated by the dominant power. Since 2015, the commemoration of National *Santri* Day has been institutionalized as an emergent tradition—a new national practice designed to preserve cultural memory while serving political and ideological functions. The celebration typically includes flag ceremonies with speeches reflecting annually changing themes. The successive themes of National *Santri* Day from 2016 to 2024 are as follows (Rohman, 2014):

- a. *Dari Pesantren untuk Indonesia* (From Pesantren for Indonesia)
- b. *Wajah Pesantren Wajah Indonesia* (The Face of Pesantren, the Face of Indonesia)
- c. *Bersama Santri Damailah Negeri*. (With *Santri*, May the Nation Be Peaceful)
- d. *Santri Indonesia untuk Perdamaian Dunia* (Indonesian *Santri* for World Peace)
- e. *Santri Sehat Indonesia Kuat* (Healthy *Santri*, Strong Indonesia)
- f. *Santri Siaga Jiwa dan Raga* (*Santri* Prepared in Mind and Body)
- g. *Berdaya Menjaga Martabat Kemanusiaan* (Empowered to Uphold Human Dignity)
- h. *Jihad Santri Jayakan Negeri* (*Santri's* Jihad Glorifies the Nation)
- i. *Menyambung Juang Merengkuh Masa Depan* (Continuing the Struggle, Embracing the Future)

The flag ceremony, as a central ritual of the commemoration, represents an emergent form—a new cultural manifestation resulting from the strong influence of state power in regulating and domesticating religious ideology under the pretext of nationalism. Historically, there has been no direct connection between the *santri* tradition and the flag ceremony, nor between Islamic ritual and the military-style upacara.

Following the ceremony, *santri* often hold parades carrying banners and wearing traditional *santri* attire—peci, sarung, and baju koko for men, while women wear muslim dresses (often also with sarung) and headscarves (jilbab).

There also exists the National *Santri* Day March, circulated through the YouTube channel Pendidikan Baznas, with the following lyrics:

*Resolusi jihad panggilan jiwa
Santri dan ulama tetap setia
Berkorban pertahankan Indonesia*

*Saat ini kita telah merdeka
Mari teruskan perjuangan ulama
Berperan aktif dengan dasar pancasila
Nusantara tanggung jawab kita*

*Reff:
Hari santri bukti cinta pada negeri
Ridho dan rahmat dari ilahi
NKRI harga mati*

Ayo santri ayo santri ayo santri

*Ayo ngaji dan patuh pada kiai
Jayalah bangsa, jaya negara
Jayalah pesantren kita*

*Mari bersiap kita berangkat
Ke pesantren dengan penuh semangat
Raih cita cita luruskan niat
Mengabdikan tuk kemaslahatan umat*

*Jayalah bangsa negara
Jayalah indonesia
Jayalah Indonesia*

English meaning:
The Jihad Resolution is a Call of the Soul
Santri and ulama remain loyal
Sacrificing to defend Indonesia

Now that we are free
Let us continue the struggle of the ulama
Actively contributing to the foundation of Pancasila
The Archipelago is our responsibility

Refrain:
National Santri Day proves love for the nation
Blessing and grace from the Almighty
NKRI is non-negotiable

Come, Santri, let us learn and obey the Kiai
Glory to the nation, glory to the state
Glory to our Pesantren

Let us go to Pesantren with a full spirit
Pursue our dreams with pure intentions
Serve for the benefit of the ummah

Glory to the nation and the state
Glory to Indonesia
Glory to Indonesia
(Source: YouTube Pendidikan Baznas)

The first section reveals a hegemonic effort to shape public opinion by constructing narratives of loyalty among santri and ulama. This dominant framing is repeatedly articulated

through key statements—such as ‘Let us continue the struggle of the ulama’—and reinforced by the strategic invocation of collective memory surrounding the Jihad Resolution, which functions to activate collective consciousness. Within this discourse, santri identity is positioned as inherently tied to obedience toward religious authority (*kiai*) and the state. The role envisioned for *santri* by the state is explicitly articulated through imperatives such as *Berperan aktif dengan dasar Pancasila, Nusantara tanggung jawab kita*, and *menjaga kejayaan bangsa dan negara*. In this rearticulation, the concept of *jihad* operates as a residual cultural element that is selectively appropriated and aligned with the dominant ideological formation—namely Pancasila and the doctrine of NKRI harga mati—thereby reinforcing state-centered hegemony rather than challenging it. These marches are always sung in the ceremonies of National *Santri* Day.

These combined elements—ceremonies, parades, and the fixed date of October 22—are unified by the dominant authority (the state) and legalized (which is the day is labelled on national calendar and known by everyone in Indonesia, such as National Children Day, National Teacher Day, and National Mother Day), thereby establishing National *Santri* Day as a cultural tradition in contemporary Indonesia. Both parties derive mutual benefits: the public gains a sense of protection amid fears of radicalism, while political elites—particularly during the campaign period—secure broader popular support.

Through National *Santri* Day, the Jokowi administration successfully legitimized its authority by invoking and institutionalizing the residual collective memory of Islamic valor during Indonesia’s independence struggle, specifically the historical moment of the Jihad Resolution.

Discussion

The commemoration of National *Santri* Day as an instrument of state-led control and prevention against the spread of radicalism—which, if left unchecked, may escalate into acts of fanaticism—appears, on the surface, to be a thoughtful and strategically relevant policy choice. By emphasizing the role of *santri* as promoters of moderate Islam, the state aims to reinforce narratives of peaceful religiosity. However, once this commemoration was formally institutionalized, a range of concerns emerged. One of the most critical among them is the growing dichotomy between “*santri*” and “non-*santri*,” a divide that necessitates thorough and careful scholarly examination because it risks creating new layers of social and religious stratification.

In 2015, Muhammadiyah publicly expressed serious reservations and ultimately rejected the establishment of National *Santri* Day, signaling a significant moment of dissent within Indonesian Islamic discourse. The organization even submitted a formal letter of protest to President Joko Widodo, emphasizing its discomfort with the policy’s implications. This opposition was later reinforced by political scientist Mada Sukmajati (Universitas Gadjah Mada), who argued that, in practice, the term *santri* narrowly refers to individuals who embody specific cultural markers—such as peci, sarung, or songkok—symbols historically associated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or the broader nahdliyin community (cnnindonesia.com, (2024)). As a result, institutionalizing National *Santri* Day risks deepening intra-Islamic boundaries and

sectarian sentiments among Indonesian Muslims. Despite these objections, Muhammadiyah's stance was treated as a minority opinion, and the Presidential Decree continued without significant reconsideration, allowing the commemoration to proceed annually as planned.

This situation prompts a fundamental and unresolved question: Who exactly qualifies as a “*santri*” within the framework of National *Santri* Day? If the term is strictly defined according to its traditional meaning—as articulated by Dhofier (1994), namely “students who study at a *pesantren*” then the implications become problematic. Millions of Indonesian Muslims have never attended a *pesantren*, yet they actively participate in religious life and contribute to Islamic discourse. Should these individuals be excluded from the nationalist-religious sentiment that National *Santri* Day seeks to cultivate? Limiting the definition risks alienating Muslims who do not fit the *pesantren*-based identity, potentially creating a hierarchy of religiosity and undermining the inclusive spirit that national commemorations are ideally meant to embody.

In reality, the opposite has occurred. National *Santri* Day is now celebrated not only by *pesantren* students but also by educational institutions under the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Madrasah Ibtidaiyah, Madrasah Tsanawiyah, Madrasah Aliyah, and State Islamic Universities). These institutions conduct flag ceremonies and other activities to mark the day. Consequently, the definition of *santri* has expanded to encompass all individuals engaged in religious learning.

Parallel to the institutionalization of National *Santri* Day, the Ayo Mondok (“Let’s Go to *Pesantren*”) movement—promoted by Nahdlatul Ulama since 2010—also gained momentum. According to Lukman Harits Dimiyati, the grandson of a *pesantren* founder in Tremas, Pacitan, this campaign emerged as a response to the perceived failure of state education institutions to provide moral and character formation for students (nu.or.id, (2015)). This critique of the national education system suggests that National *Santri* Day serves as a means to reorient society toward traditional Islamic values, typically taught through *kitab kuning* (classical Islamic texts) in *pesantren* settings.

However, another concerning phenomenon accompanies this development: the widespread observance of National *Santri* Day by public (state) schools, which are expected to uphold inclusivity. For example, SDN Dawuan published on its official website photos of students participating in a ceremony dressed entirely in white to commemorate National *Santri* Day 2024 (<https://sdn1dawuan.sch.id/>, (2024)). Similarly, SMPN 1 Kragan instructed its students to wear “*santri* clothing” for the celebration (<https://www.smp1kragan.sch.id/>, (2024)).

Such practices in secular public schools risk narrowing the space for pluralism. Granting special recognition to Muslim identity within state educational institutions may inadvertently generate a sense of inequality and exclusion among non-Muslim minorities who are “not celebrated.” This growing concern reflects broader criticism of the national education system’s failure to cultivate an inclusive environment that ensures equal rights and comfort for all citizens regardless of religious difference.

More problematically, National *Santri* Day may lead to a subtle form of empowerment imbalance (overpowering) among *santri* or former *santri*, who may feel privileged by the state’s acknowledgment of their collective identity. According to Williams (1977:135), the emergence

of new cultural traditions (emergent forms) is often associated with the rise of complex and significant class dynamics within society. Through the government's valorization of the *santri*'s role in Indonesia's struggle for independence, the state inadvertently elevates one religious group while neglecting others.

This raises ethical concerns regarding historical fairness and inclusivity. As Hakh (2018) notes, during the Japanese occupation in 1942, 90 Christian pastors and church elders in Ambon were executed for refusing to hoist the Japanese flag on the church pulpit or bow to the Emperor before worship. Their sacrifice likewise represents religiously inspired patriotism, yet it has not received similar national recognition.

Conclusion

National *Santri* Day embodies a complex form of historicity. The government, as the dominant power, has created an emergent tradition from the residual values of the 1945 Jihad Resolution by institutionalizing National *Santri* Day through ritualized flag ceremonies, the singing of the National *Santri* March, and the dissemination of nationalist ideals framed within religious discourse every October 22.

Beyond its political utility, this commemoration functions as a social mechanism to respond to collective fears and past traumas concerning radical movements in Indonesia. By transforming the memory of Jihad Resolution into an annual state ritual, the government seeks to reaffirm nationalism through Islamic symbolism while promoting stability in the face of perceived religious extremism.

However, on the other hand, this state-patented tradition may also be understood as an institutionalized cultural-political container infused with emotion—a construct that appears necessary for Indonesian Muslims today but, in practice, fails to generate new critical discourse capable of rebuilding or advancing the nation. Rather than fostering interfaith understanding and pluralistic nationalism, National Santri Day, which effectively mobilizes residual memory to serve dominant objectives, risks reproducing selective historical narratives that prioritize certain religious identities over others.

The critical reading of the National Santri Day policy presented in this article has not yet directly involved the broader public in assessing how National Santri Day has shaped ideology and discourses of state resilience in the years following its legalization. This gap may serve as a productive avenue for future research.

Author Contribution Statement

Miranti Rohmanda: Conceptualization and Research Design; Data Curation and Investigation; Methodology; Project Administration; Writing - Original Draft; Writing - Review & Editing. **Manneke Budiman:** Methodology; Formal Analysis and Visualization; Writing - Review & Editing

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