



Eliminating Sectoral Ego in Law Enforcement: Integrating Whistleblowing Systems for Corruption Eradication in the Indonesian Judicial System

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Abstract:


Corruption in Indonesia's judicial system remains a persistent structural problem, exacerbated by sectoral egos among law enforcement agencies and the fragmentation of existing mechanisms for reporting violations. Currently, the reporting system is not implemented in an integrated manner, thereby weakening coordination, undermining legal protection for whistleblowers, and creating procedural loopholes that facilitate impunity. This study aims to analyse the urgency of integrating the violation reporting system among law enforcement agencies as a strategic tool to eradicate corruption in the judicial system. Using a normative legal research methodology with a conceptual approach, this study combines a sociological-legal approach with empirical data from corruption case reports, institutional policies, and secondary data from anti-corruption agency reports from year to year. Although each law enforcement institution in the criminal justice system has its own whistleblowing mechanism, these remain fragmented, so integration is needed to enable mutual oversight, overlapping authority, and weak coordination between agencies, which reduces the effectiveness of corruption detection and eradication. An integrated reporting system, supported by comprehensive regulations and adequate whistleblower protection mechanisms, can improve transparency, accountability, and inter-agency coordination. This study concludes that eliminating sectoral egos through regulatory harmonisation and digital integration of reporting systems is a prerequisite for sustainable judicial reform. It is recommended that the government establish a centralised and interoperable reporting system.

Keywords:

anti-corruption governance; corruption; inter-agency coordination; integrating whistleblowing; law enforcement; whistleblowing system.

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Introduction

Corruption within the Indonesian judicial system remains a structural problem that is difficult to eradicate effectively, despite the establishment of various legal and institutional mechanisms. Practices such as bribery in court cases, judicial mafias, the buying and selling of verdicts, and government interference in the law enforcement process demonstrate that judicial corruption is no longer merely an individual issue but has evolved into a systemic network involving various actors across institutions. This situation is reflected in the numerous sting operations carried out by the Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi - KPK*) against judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and court officials in recent years. This fact demonstrates that the main problem in combating corruption in the

judicial sector lies not merely in weak regulations, but in the lack of effective coordination and integration between law enforcement agencies in collectively addressing and preventing corruption.

The existence of a whistleblowing system can serve as a vital tool in uncovering covert and organised corruption. However, the effectiveness of such systems in Indonesia continues to face various practical obstacles, particularly the lack of protection for whistleblowers, insufficient inter-agency coordination, and the absence of guarantees of consistent follow-up on submitted reports. Many corruption whistleblowers actually face intimidation, criminalisation, job transfers, and even threats to their safety after exposing malpractice within their institutions. These conditions indicate that legal protection for whistleblowers is not yet effective, despite being regulated in various normative provisions. Consequently, a culture of silence within the bureaucracy and law enforcement remains very strong, as individuals prefer to avoid risk rather than report acts of corruption.

Corruption in the Indonesian judicial system is a structural problem that directly reduces legal legitimacy, undermines public trust, and hinders the realisation of the rule of law. Although various legal instruments have been established, law enforcement practices still face many obstacles, one of which is sectoral egoism among law enforcement agencies.¹ This sectoral ego is reflected in weak coordination, competition for authority, and resistance to external and internal oversight mechanisms. This situation causes the law enforcement process in the judicial system to often be suboptimal, and in some cases, even involves law enforcement officials themselves.² A critical view of this problem necessitates strengthening the whistleblowing system as a strategic instrument that is increasingly relevant. This system should be integrated into a coordinated and collaborative law enforcement framework so that it can serve as an early-detection and prevention mechanism against latent and affordable corruption practices.³ This is because, so far, the impression of integrated law enforcement is still far from expectations, with each institution working independently, thereby weakening the potential for mutual oversight mechanisms.⁴

There are several concepts regarding the issue of gosektoral. First, sectoral ego in the context of law enforcement refers to the tendency of institutions to maintain their dominance of authority, close access to information, and prioritise the interests of the organisation over the interests of the legal system as a whole.⁵ Second, law enforcement is the process of implementing legal norms through investigation, inquiry, prosecution, and examination in court by institutions such as the Indonesian National Police, the Attorney General's Office of

¹ Gregorius Widiartana, "Regulating Illicit Enrichment into Indonesia's Anti-Corruption Legal Reform Regime," *Neoclassical Legal Review: Journal of Law and Contemporary Issues* 4, no. 2 (November 2025): 106-12, <https://doi.org/10.32734/nlrjolci.v4i2.20794>.

² Febby Mutiara Nelson and Abni Nur Aini, "Bridging the Gap of Ineffective Coordination in Indonesia: A Comparative Study on the Functional Differentiation and Dominus Litis Principle," *Media Juris* 8, no. 3 (October 2025): 387-416, <https://doi.org/10.20473/mi.v8i3.77425>.

³ Bobby Briando, Sri Kuncoro Bawono, and Tony Mirwanto, "Dimension of Whistleblowing System: Urgency of Legislation Strengthening," *Jurnal Hukum Dan Peradilan* 8, no. 3 (December 12, 2019): 371, <https://doi.org/10.25216/jhp.8.3.2019.371-390>.

⁴ Agus Joko Pramono and Mohamad Iqbal Aruzzi, "The Implementation of a Whistleblowing System as an Anti-Corruption Initiative in Indonesian Government Institutions," *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi* 9, no. 2 (December 2023): 195-212, <https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v9i2.942>.

⁵ Aristo Pangaribuan, "Indonesia's Criminal Justice System: A Case Study of Inter-Agency Conflict and the Fight for Power," *Asian Journal of Law and Society*, October 2025, 1-27, <https://doi.org/10.1017/als.2025.10018>.

the Republic of Indonesia, and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia.⁶ Third, a whistleblowing system is a mechanism for reporting violations that allows individuals within an organisation to safely and securely disclose alleged criminal acts or ethical violations.⁷ Fourth, corruption in the judicial system includes the abuse of authority by law enforcement officials for personal or group gain, which is contrary to the principles of integrity and independence of the judiciary.⁸ Whistleblowing systems are important because they are regarded as instruments of internal and external oversight capable of uncovering corrupt practices that are difficult to detect through standard formal mechanisms. Corruption within the judicial system is generally carried out in secret and involves complex power dynamics; consequently, internal whistleblowers occupy a strategic position in facilitating access to information. Therefore, research must clarify that the whistleblowing system is not merely an administrative reporting mechanism, but rather an integral part of a corruption prevention and eradication strategy based on participation and transparency.

Empirical evidence to date indicates that corruption in the law enforcement sector still occurs despite strict supervision. For example, many judges, prosecutors, and investigators have been involved in corruption cases, either caught red-handed in sting operations related to bribery or through audits and reports⁹. One case that has attracted public attention is the bribery case involving a judge at a district court in the handling of strategic corruption and civil cases, including the bribery of the judge examining the Ronal Tanur case at the Surabaya Regional Court. It was here, while the prosecutor's investigators were conducting their inquiries, that the importance of whistleblowing became clear in exposing bribery practices implicating law enforcement officials themselves. Incidents such as this can be prevented if there is an integrated whistleblowing mechanism. These facts reveal systemic problems, weak inter-institutional transparency, minimal protection for internal whistleblowers, and fragmented oversight. In some cases, internal reports are not followed up effectively due to conflicts of interest and a defensive organisational culture. This situation shows that a repressive approach alone is not sufficient without structural reforms that integrate an independent and protected reporting system.

Prevailing research has predominantly highlighted judicial corruption from the perspective of repressive law enforcement, strengthening judicial independence, or institutional reform. Firstly, The Effectiveness of Corruption Eradication: Integrated System Approach, about the author writes that Repressive and preventive measures must be implemented simultaneously and in an integrated manner; this demonstrates comprehensive cooperation and remains very common, whereas this study focuses on preventing and addressing corruption through whistleblowing that is integrated. Second, research by title

⁶ M Zaid et al., "Reformulation of Justice Collaborator Protection Regulations in Corruption Cases: The Urgency for Legal Reform in Indonesia," *Indonesian Journal of Crime and Criminal Justice* 1, no. 3 (November 2025): 358–407, <https://doi.org/10.62264/ijcc.v1i3.198>.

⁷ Rizaldi Tri Andriansyah, Ida Widianingsih, and Nina Karlina, "Analysis of the Implementation of the Whistleblowing System in the Kendari City Government," *Sosiohumaniora* 26, no. 1 (2024): 117–27, <https://doi.org/10.24198/sosiohumaniora.v26i1.52962>.

⁸ R P da Cruz, A M Tilma, and A C da Silva, "Law Enforcement of State Losses Through Civil Proceedings: Exploration of the Role and Analysis of Alternative Options in Corruption Cases," *UNES Law Review* 6, no. 4 (2024): 9768–80, <https://doi.org/10.31933/unesrev.v6i4.1850>.

⁹ Fendi Nugroho, Hartiwiningsih Hartiwiningsih, and I Gusti Ayu Ketut Rachmi Handayani, "Rethinking Subsidiary in Corruption Cases: Indonesian Experiences," *Journal of Human Rights, Culture and Legal System* 5, no. 2 (September 2025): 686–713, <https://doi.org/10.53955/jhcls.v5i2.714>.

Impact of digitalisation on the justice system: Challenges of administrative justice. This study examines the impact of digital service systems that can provide convenience and safeguard the rights of those seeking justice, without discussing the aspect of sectoral ego as a coordination obstacle. Third, studies on Whistleblowing mechanism: what factors make it effective. This study examines the effectiveness of implementing a whistleblowing scheme in relation to complaint-handling services in general, both within government institutions and law enforcement agencies.

The novelty of this research lies in its integrative approach. The uniqueness of this study lies in its linking the issue of sectoral ego within law enforcement agencies to the optimisation of the whistleblowing system within the Indonesian judicial system. Unlike previous studies, which generally discuss the whistleblowing system merely as a mechanism for preventing corruption or examine sectoral fragmentation in isolation, this study focuses the whistleblowing system, more specifically on inter-agency coordination and judicial governance reform. Thus, this study offers a conceptual model for integrating the whistleblowing mechanism as a means of reducing institutional fragmentation and strengthening collaborative law enforcement against corruption in the judicial sector

Method

This study used a normative-empirical approach, supported by secondary data in the form of tertiary legal materials, namely media news sources. This approach was chosen to provide a comprehensive examination of sectoral self-interest in law enforcement and of the integration of the whistleblowing system as a strategic instrument in the fight against corruption within the Indonesian judicial system. Researchers have been observing the police, the public prosecutor's office, and the courts, including the Corruption Eradication Commission, from 2023 to 2025 regarding the handling of complaints and the reporting of corruption offences. Secondary data collection for legal purposes was carried out through library research, involving a systematic review of relevant literature. This included a document review of official reports, institutional policies, and documents relating to the implementation of the whistleblowing system within law enforcement agencies. Analysis is conducted qualitatively using descriptive-analytical and prescriptive methods, which include describing the phenomenon of sectoral ego in law enforcement, analysing the relationship between institutional fragmentation and the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts, and formulating an integrative framework for the whistleblowing system as a strategic solution. The analysis also utilised legal reasoning techniques, both deductive and inductive, to draw systematic and argumentative conclusions. The existence of separate whistleblowing systems within each law enforcement agency has resulted in the enforcement of criminal corruption laws being highly fragmented. This fragmentation has led to many corruption cases stalling or being abandoned without a clear resolution.¹⁰ Consequently, there is a need for an integrated system to address this issue as a mechanism for checks and balances.

¹⁰ Juliana Waromi and Syaikhul Falah, "Whistleblowing Studies for Corruption Prevention in Indonesian Local Governments: A Systematic Literature Review," *Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi Kesatuan* 13, no. 6 (2025): 1775-88, <https://doi.org/10.37641/jiakes.v13i6.4448>.

Discussion

1. Weakness Legal Framework for the Whistleblowing System in Indonesia.

The implementation of the Whistleblowing System in the public sector in Indonesia forms part of the implementation of ratified international law.¹¹ It is in accordance with the international convention organised by the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which was subsequently ratified by Indonesia through the UNCAC Ratification Law of 2006. In Article 37, the Convention stipulates the obligation of each State Party to consider granting leniency or a reduction in sentence to offenders who provide substantial cooperation (as justice collaborators) during the investigation or prosecution process. Furthermore, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC), ratified by the UNTOC Ratification Law of 2009, contains provisions encouraging member states to consider granting immunity or special treatment to corrupt individuals who cooperate in investigations or prosecutions. Peters argues that, from a technical and legal standpoint, corruption can be regarded as a violation of human rights. She also suggests that the international community should view corruption not merely as a criminal act but also as a violation that undermines fundamental human rights, thereby providing a stronger legal basis for efforts to prevent and combat it globally.¹²


Under Indonesian positive law, the role of cooperating witnesses in relation to corruption offences is broadly regulated by a number of legislative provisions, including the Protection of Witness and Victims Law of 2006 (amending 2014) states that cooperating witnesses may be granted special treatment during the investigation process and be awarded for the testimony they provide.¹³ This differs from the role of whistleblowing in uncovering criminal offences. The implementation of the whistleblowing system for reporting allegations of corruption has not been effective. Many cases appear to have stalled, and most law enforcement proceedings stem from investigations or audits conducted by the Inspectorate. Yet, if we examine the findings of these investigations, many have been misused or manipulated for particular interests. The following are the results of the Public Prosecutor's Office's anti-corruption efforts.¹⁴

¹¹ Apriliana Rahma Nuraini and Edward Niel, "Ratification of the UN Anti-Corruption Convention: Legal and Political Implications in Indonesia and Its Context within Southeast Asian International Law Discourse," *International Law Discourse in Southeast Asia* 3, no. 1 (January 2024), <https://doi.org/10.15294/ildisea.v3i1.78888>.

¹² Anne Peters, "Corruption as a Violation of International Human Rights," *European Journal of International Law* 29, no. 4 (December 2018): 1251-87, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chy070>.

¹³ Syamsul Alam Fahmi Fauzi Amiruddin, Nur Fadhilah Mappaselleng, "Justice Collaborator In Disclosure Action Criminal Corruption," <https://jurnal.fh.umi.ac.id/index.php/COJML/Article/View/959/323#toc>, 2025.

¹⁴ Zararah Azhim Syah, "Laporan Hasil Pemantauan Tren Korupsi Tahun 2024," *Divisi Hukum Dan Investigasi: Indonesia Corruption Watch* (Jakarta, 2025).

Figure 1. Trends in Corruption Prosecutions, 2020–2024

Source: the Public Prosecutor's Office

There is indeed a decline in corruption cases, but this is not due to a decrease in the number of corrupt acts; rather, it is influenced by institutional and budgetary factors in the enforcement of anti-corruption measures. Meanwhile, although there are many public complaints, they are not being addressed. The various law enforcement agencies have not yet provided transparent information on how many complaints have been received and how many have been followed up on. This problem exists because there is currently no legal framework that explicitly provides a basis for an integrated whistleblowing system. Currently, the guidelines for implementing the whistleblowing system are under the Corruption Eradication Commission Law of 2002 (amended 2019). This law regulates the Corruption Eradication Commission's powers, which include reporting mechanisms, working networks, and the management of the whistleblowing system for reporting gratification.¹⁵ However, the Commission for the Eradication of Corruption has not yet comprehensively regulated this across relevant agencies. It remains sectoral and fragmented.

The technical provisions of legislation designed to protect whistleblowers, witnesses, and victims remain fragmented. These provisions include, amongst several others:

- a. Government Regulation No. 71 of 2000 on Procedures for Public Participation and the Awarding of Rewards in the Prevention and Eradication of Corruption. This regulation defines the role of whistleblowers and the mechanism for rewarding them for their contribution to the eradication of corruption.
- b. Government Regulation No. 57 of 2003 on Procedures for the Special Protection of Whistleblowers and Witnesses in Money Laundering Offences. This regulation is an example of sector-specific legislation for the protection of whistleblowers, which is relevant to cases of money laundering offences that are often linked to corruption.
- c. Presidential Instructions as national policies on corruption prevention and concrete action programs, namely Presidential Instructions No. 2 of 2014; No. 7 of 2015; and No. 10 of 2016 on Actions to Prevent and Eradicate Corruption, which

¹⁵ Abdul Jalil, *Community Engagement in Eradicating Corruption: Evaluating the Effectiveness and Reward Models for Whistleblowers As a Regional Strategy*, vol. 8313, n.d., [tps://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15294/jphi.v8i1.20440](https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15294/jphi.v8i1.20440).

instruct ministries, agencies, and local governments to implement preventive measures, including strengthening the WBS or public reporting channels.

- d. Regulations of the Corruption Eradication Commission and other technical rules relating to the reporting of gratuities (whistleblowing), such as, the Corruption Eradication Commission Regulation No. 2 of 2019 on the Reporting of Gratuities and the electronic guidelines on the reporting of gratuities. The commission has also launched an online reporting portal.

Meanwhile, the Protection of Witness and Victims Law of 2006 which regulates the rights and protection of witnesses, the rights of whistleblowers, the prohibition on prosecuting whistleblowers for their reports, and the role of the Witness and Victim Protection Agency in providing physical, psychological, and administrative protection,¹⁶ only addresses the protection of whistleblowers within the system and has not yet provided a legal framework or integrated management. The Indonesian judicial system still has legal loopholes and regulatory overlaps in the implementation of the whistleblowing system to combat corruption. Existing whistleblowing mechanisms are regulated separately by each law enforcement agency, resulting in fragmented reporting procedures, inconsistent protection standards, and unclear coordination mechanisms. This situation creates legal uncertainty about institutional authority in handling corruption reports involving perpetrators. Furthermore, overlapping jurisdictions between the police, the public prosecutor's office, anti-corruption agencies, and judicial oversight bodies often lead to inter-agency rivalry rather than cooperation. The absence of an integrated reporting system and harmonised regulations further reinforces sectoral self-interest, leading to delays, duplication of investigations, and weak coordination in the enforcement of anti-corruption laws.

These legal and institutional weaknesses have serious consequences for the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts within the Indonesian judicial system. Sectoral self-interest drives institutions to prioritise organisational interests over collaborative law enforcement, thereby undermining accountability and public trust. Fragmented oversight and poor information sharing also create opportunities for corruption networks to operate across institutions without being effectively detected. Therefore, this study argues that the integration of the whistleblowing system should not focus solely on administrative or technological reforms, but must form part of a broader judicial governance reform aimed at harmonising institutional powers, strengthening whistleblower protection, and establishing collaborative anti-corruption law enforcement mechanisms within the Indonesian judicial system.

2. Fragmentation of the Whistleblowing System Among Law Enforcement Authorities.

Every law enforcement institution in Indonesia has its own internal whistleblowing system, but these systems are not yet integrated. This fragmentation leads to poor coordination, potential overlaps in jurisdiction, and the risk of whistleblowers' identities being compromised. The whistleblowing system is one form of digitalisation of public services in

¹⁶ Abdul Wahid, "The Urgency of Whistleblowers Legal Protection in the Criminal Justice System" 16, no. 4 (2022): 353-70, <https://doi.org/10.25041/fiatjustisia.v16no4.2660>.

the area of complaint reporting. In a study conducted by Apriani,¹⁷ the findings indicate that the digitalisation of public services can reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen both internal oversight within the relevant agencies and external oversight through public participation. However, the successful implementation of this technology is highly dependent on the integrity of those responsible for its implementation, supportive regulations, and the availability of digital infrastructure. Whistleblowers play a vital role in exposing cases of corruption, as the information they provide is often key to establishing the facts. However, in practice, whistleblowers frequently face threats, intimidation, and risks to their own safety and that of their families.¹⁸

The Indonesian National Police's Whistleblowing System is an information channel within the Indonesian National Police designed to enable the online reporting of indications of criminal acts of corruption and/or corrupt behaviour within the organisation committed by civil servants within the Indonesian National Police. Reports must include a chronological account and supporting evidence as initial information, whilst the whistleblower (informant) is entitled to protection, and their identity remains anonymous. However, the Indonesian National Police's WBS still contains provisions stipulating that the Information Provider (Whistleblower) must be a civil servant within the Indonesian National Police, whether a police officer or a civil servant employed by the Indonesian National Police. Consequently, this WBS still requires further development to ensure its functions are more effective and its objectives are achieved. The current legislation still fails to provide optimal protection for civil servant whistleblowers, whether in terms of personal safety, career security, or legal protection against retaliation. Furthermore, he believes that the current reporting mechanisms are ineffective and still fail to adequately safeguard the confidentiality of the whistleblower's identity.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the Whistleblowing System at the Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Indonesia, via the E-Prowas system, can receive public complaints. Through this website, complainants can report matters relating to alleged misconduct or unprofessional behaviour by prosecutors and administrative staff in the performance of their duties. However, on the websites of High and District Public Prosecutor's Offices, there are still web pages in the form of Google Forms that are highly vulnerable to unauthorised access and do not provide adequate protection for complainants. Furthermore, there are no oversight mechanisms or services relating to complaints of corruption that are secure and accountable.²⁰

The whistleblowing system at the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia utilises E-Siwas, a system operated by the Supreme Court Supervisory Board, which is used to report alleged misconduct by judges and/or court staff. Judges, as the authority responsible for

¹⁷ Evi Apriani, Prabu Kemal Manaf, and Vivi Riska Ramadani, "Digitalisasi Sebagai Solusi Untuk Mengurangi Korupsi Di Sektor Pelayanan Publik," 2025, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.55606/eksekusi.v3i2.1851>.

¹⁸ Ahmad Irzal Fardiansyah, Ramadani Fitra, and Diansyah Pratama, "Additional Legal Protection for Corruption Whistleblowers" 18, no. 1 (2024): 19–30, <https://doi.org/10.25041/fiatjustisia.v18n01.3273>.

¹⁹ Ridwan Ridwan Austin Al Hariz, Hibnu Nugroho, "Reconstruction of Legal Protection for Civil Servants as Whistleblowers in Eradicating Corruption Crimes in Indonesia," *Journal of Law and Legal Reform* 5, no. 3 (2024): 1, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15294/jllr.v5i3.16334>.

²⁰ Misnah Irvita, "Transparency and Accountability in the Justice System : Building Public Trust and Justice," *Priviet Social Sciences Journal* 5 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.55942/pssj.v5i4.367>.

adjudicating cases, do not always exercise this authority optimally or with integrity in practice. For instance, data on cases of judicial bribery reveals that Supreme Court Justices are still suspected of accepting bribes from trustees to approve the reclassification of assets from bankruptcy estate to non-bankruptcy estate, thereby undermining legal certainty and the objectives of bankruptcy proceedings.²¹ In bribery cases, the Corruption Eradication Commission and the State Audit Agency have not yet been able to establish any loss to the state, given that the funds involved stem from corrupt practices. Complaints are difficult to monitor and follow up on if they relate solely to judges' codes of conduct, whilst complaints regarding gratuities are rarely raised. The arrests of judges to date have still been based on investigations or surveillance.

Conflicts of interest between institutions are particularly evident in the lack of integration of whistleblower systems across agencies. This highlights the weakness of a legal approach that is overly repressive and lacks a secure reporting system, which discourages the public from reporting any irregularities. Therefore, there is a need to reinforce the urgency of protecting whistleblowers as part of good governance and administrative oversight. This provides a conceptual basis that whistleblowers are not merely tools for law enforcement, but instruments of bureaucratic reform.²² In otherwise Workers are generally reluctant to report corruption for fear of losing their jobs, facing retaliation or other consequences. Therefore, there is a need for stronger and clearer legal reforms, including a dedicated law that comprehensively regulates the protection of whistleblowers, safeguarding workers' rights and ensuring effective enforcement mechanisms.²³

The fragmentation of the whistleblowing system amongst law enforcement agencies in Indonesia essentially reflects structural and technical issues within the judicial system. Institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission, the Indonesian National Police, the Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia each operate separate reporting mechanisms with differing procedures, technological standards, and verification systems. This fragmentation creates unequal access for whistleblowers because reporting channels are not integrated and are often difficult to navigate when corruption cases involve multiple parties within the judicial environment. Technically, the absence of interconnected databases and a coordinated reporting platform limits information exchange between agencies, resulting in delays in investigations and overlapping case handling. Normatively, there is also no unified legal framework that clearly regulates inter-agency coordination in processing reports of corruption within the judicial sector.

This fragmentation further reinforces sectoral self-interest, undermines whistleblower protection, and weakens mechanisms for following up on reports of corruption. Each

²¹ Gabriella Widya and Desi Adhariani, "Implementation of Whistleblowing System in Indonesia Definition of Whistleblowing Application of the Violation," in *ICOACI 2019 - International Conference on Anti-Corruption and Integrity*, 2020, 40-48, <https://doi.org/10.5220/0009399400400048>.

²² Sidik Sunaryo and Asrul Ibrahim Nur, "Legal Policy of Anti-Corruption Supervisor Design: A New Anti-Corruption Model in Indonesia," *Bestuur* 10, no. 2 (2022): 137-58, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.20961/bestuur.v10i2.65105>.

²³ Padrisan Jamba Syalshabila, Giovanni, "Legal Protection for Whistleblowers from an Indonesian Employment Perspective," *Jurnal Multidisiplin Sahombu* 6, no. 3 (2026).

institution applies different confidentiality standards and protective measures, creating uncertainty about the whistleblowers' safety, particularly in cases involving judicial officials or powerful legal actors. In practice, reports submitted through one institution are often not effectively followed up on due to sectoral limitations and unclear institutional authority. This situation undermines accountability within the judicial system and reinforces public distrust in the enforcement of anti-corruption laws. Consequently, the fragmented reporting of violations in Indonesia is not merely an administrative problem, but reflects deeper structural weaknesses in judicial governance, where institutional sectarianism hinders integrated anti-corruption efforts.

If we compare the handling of corruption cases in Indonesia and Malaysia today, corrupt practices no longer take place in secret but instead exploit formal legal and administrative mechanisms to appear procedurally legitimate, whilst undermining substantive justice and the public interest.²⁴ In establishing comprehensive anti-corruption policies, it is necessary to apply standard benchmarks, which could, for example, be adopted from European Union reforms alongside the harmonisation of national laws, the strengthening of anti-corruption institutions at both central and regional levels, and the enhancement of public participation. Without an effective anti-corruption system at the local level, decentralisation risks merely shifting corrupt practices to the regions. Anti-corruption reform must be carried out comprehensively through a combination of preventive, repressive, and institutional approaches, accompanied by effective criminalisation of corruption and an independent and professional law enforcement system.²⁵

The comparison with Malaysia is intended to identify specific institutional and regulatory mechanisms that can serve as a reference for strengthening the integration of the whistleblowing system within the Indonesian judicial system. Malaysia was chosen because it has established a more centralised whistleblower protection model through the Whistleblower Protection Act 2010, which provides for clearer coordination mechanisms between reporting agencies and law enforcement authorities. Unlike Indonesia, where whistleblowing mechanisms remain fragmented across various judicial institutions, Malaysia has placed whistleblower protection within a more integrated legal framework, thereby enabling clearer procedures regarding the submission of reports, confidentiality, witness protection, and institutional follow-up. This framework reduces overlapping jurisdictions and minimises sectoral conflicts in handling corruption reports involving public officials and judicial actors.

In Malaysia, the whistleblowing system relies not only on the existence of reporting channels but also on legal certainty regarding institutional coordination and safeguards for whistleblowers. A concrete lesson for Indonesia is the need to establish integrated regulations that standardise reporting procedures, inter-agency information exchange, and follow-up obligations amongst judicial institutions. Indonesia also requires clearer legal provisions to

²⁴ Adithiya Diar et al., "A Comparative Analysis of the Transformation of Corruption Practices in Indonesia and Malaysia," *Indonesian Journal of Criminal Law Studies* 10, no. 2 (2025): 851–900, <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15294/ijcls.v10i2.30206>.

²⁵ Aleksei Fedotov and Maryna Voloshyna, "Reformation of the Institutional Anti-Corruption System in the Context of European Integration Transformation," *Baltic Journal of Economic Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 22, 2019): 224, <https://doi.org/10.30525/2256-0742/2019-5-1-224-232>.

protect confidentiality, immunity from retaliation, and institutional accountability for unresolved reports. Therefore, a comparison with Malaysia can strengthen the argument that eliminating sectoral ego within the Indonesian judicial system requires not only technological integration, but also comprehensive legal harmonisation capable of creating a coordinated and accountable system for the reporting of criminal offences to prevent and defeat corruption. In the fight against corruption, a purely repressive approach is not sufficient; it must be complemented by preventive measures, such as bureaucratic transparency, public oversight, the digitisation of government services, and the strengthening of ethics and an anti-corruption culture.²⁶ including public participation through an integrated whistleblowing system. This means that the community plays a collective role, not solely the responsibility of law enforcement. The community must also be involved.

3. A Model for the Integration of Whistleblowing Systems Across Law Enforcement Authorities.

From a legal governance perspective, the integration framework must be based on three key elements harmonisation of legislation, institutional interoperability, and accountability mechanisms. Firstly, harmonisation is necessary to eliminate overlapping jurisdictions and normative inconsistencies amongst existing anti-corruption, judicial, and witness protection regulations. Second, institutional interoperability must be legally mandated to ensure secure information exchange and coordinated investigations between judicial bodies without breaching procedural law principles. Third, accountability mechanisms must include independent oversight, mandatory response deadlines, and legal sanctions for institutions or officials who disregard, delay, or retaliate against whistleblowers. Within this legal framework, the whistleblowing system can function not only as a reporting instrument but also as a binding institutional coordination mechanism, capable of reducing sectoral ego and strengthening the fight against corruption within the Indonesian judicial system.

Integration refers to the blending of elements to form a complete or unified whole (according to the Indonesian dictionary). In the context of information systems, system integration refers to a series of processes designed to connect, both physically and functionally, several computerised systems and application software.²⁷ The integration of information systems can be achieved by utilising artificial intelligence (AI), the digitisation of the criminal justice system, and its legal implications for the principles of due process of law and the protection of human rights. Such integration has great potential to improve efficiency, administrative accuracy, and the speed of legal proceedings.²⁸ Integration between law enforcement agencies is essential in preventing and combating corruption, which is still frequently committed by individual judges, prosecutors, and police officers who accept bribes from parties involved in cases. The continued existence of such bribery practices serves as a

²⁶ Ni Nyoman Tri Partini Miko Jaya Nanda Pratama, Zaenal Arifin, "Effectiveness of Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2025 in Preventing Government Procurement Corruption," *Journal Juridisch* 4 (1), no. 188–209 (2026), <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.26623/jj.v4i1.13521>.


²⁷ Jay Mark Edayan et al., "Integration Technologies in Laboratory Information Systems: A Systematic Review," *Informatics in Medicine Unlocked* 50 (2024): 101566, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.imu.2024.101566>.

²⁸ Lusi Zafriana, "Integrasi Kecerdasan Buatan Dalam Penegakan Hukum," *Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu Sosial Dan Eksakta* 5, no. 1 (September 2025): 24–36, <https://doi.org/10.47134/trilogi.v5i1.1688>.

key driver for the integration of information systems across law enforcement institutions.²⁹ An example of the Chinese government’s anti-corruption policies, as described by Deng, explains that a major change in China’s anti-corruption system came with the establishment of the National Supervision Commission, which transformed the old dual-track system into a single anti-corruption body. The previous anti-corruption efforts, carried out by the Party’s Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC) and the procuratorate, were deemed ineffective due to strong interference from local party leaders. The central government merged the functions of the DIC and the procuratorate into the SC. This reform reduced the influence of local party leaders and centralised anti-corruption authority at the central level. Formally, the new system appears to strengthen the role of the law and the efficiency of anti-corruption efforts.³⁰

This consolidation policy cannot be implemented in Indonesia; however, the integration of digital systems can ensure that inter-agency oversight remains integrity-driven. In the context of combating corruption, the progressive application of the law is achieved through the active and creative role of law enforcement officials. Judges, prosecutors, and lawyers are expected not only to adhere strictly to the letter of the law but also to consider sociological aspects in order to achieve substantive justice. Furthermore, there is a need to restructure the powers of law enforcement agencies to ensure greater independence, as well as to encourage the Corruption Eradication Commission to act more proactively in the fight against corruption.³¹

Figure 2. Flowchart Integrasi Whistleblowing System



Source: author’s

²⁹ Rob McCusker, “Review of Anti-Corruption Strategies,” *Technical and Background Paper*, no. 23 (2006): 75.

³⁰ Fenfei Li and Jinting Deng, “The Power and the Misuse of Power by China’s Local Procuratorates in Anticorruption,” *International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice* 45 (June 2016): 1–25, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2015.10.002>.

³¹ Efraim Mbomba Reda, I Nyoman Putu Budiarta, and I Made Minggu Widyantara, “Konsep Hukum Progresif Dalam Pengaturan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Di Indonesia,” *Jurnal Interpretasi Hukum* 1, no. 2 (September 2020): 35–39, <https://doi.org/10.22225/juinhum.1.2.2431.35-39>.

The model for integrating the whistleblowing reporting system amongst law enforcement agencies is designed as a coordinated legal and institutional mechanism, aimed at eliminating sectoral self-interest in the fight against corruption within the Indonesian judicial system. This model begins with the report submission by a whistleblower via an integrated reporting channel accessible to all relevant judicial law enforcement agencies. Within this framework, reports concerning corruption involving judicial actors, prosecutors, police officers, court officials, or other law enforcement personnel are no longer processed exclusively within separate institutional systems, but are incorporated into a unified reporting mechanism supported by inter-agency coordination. This integrated approach is intended to prevent institutional fragmentation, overlapping of authority, and the selective handling of corruption cases that often occur as a result from sectoral interests among institutions.

Upon submission of a report, the system conducts an initial verification and classification process through a coordinated review mechanism involving the relevant authorities within the judicial system. At this stage, the identity of the reporter and the confidentiality of the reported information are legally protected through standardised security procedures applicable across all participating agencies. The coordinating body then determines the competent authority to conduct further investigations whilst ensuring that relevant institutions retain access to necessary information through mutually integrated data-sharing mechanisms. This process aims to eliminate inter-agency competition and strengthen collaborative law enforcement by ensuring that corruption reports are followed up transparently, efficiently, and without procedural duplication. Furthermore, this model includes mandatory monitoring and accountability mechanisms, including response deadlines, oversight reviews, and legal sanctions for agencies or officials who delay, obstruct, or disregard reports of corruption.

The integrated whistleblowing model positions whistleblower protection as a central element of judicial governance reform. Protection mechanisms include confidentiality guarantees, protection from retaliation, legal immunity for good-faith reporting, and institutional safeguards throughout the investigation and adjudication process. Through this model, whistleblowing systems function not merely as administrative reporting tools, but as legally binding coordination mechanisms capable of reducing sectoral ego among law enforcement authorities. Consequently, the integration of whistleblowing systems strengthens institutional accountability, improves inter-agency cooperation, and enhances the effectiveness of corruption eradication within the Indonesian judicial system. Under this scheme, the whistleblowing mechanisms operated by the Police, the Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Courts will remain in place and accessible. These include: the Police Whistleblowing System (WBS), the Attorney General's Office's E-Prowas system, the Supreme Court Supervisory Board's E-Siwas system, and the WBS systems within each subordinate institution. Members of the public will be able to submit reports from anywhere, supplemented by an integrated WBS system to be managed by a designated body.³²

³² Abdullah Said et al., "Corruption Forms, Typology, Causes, and Prevention Measures Based on a Case Study in the Government of Riau Province, Indonesia," *Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University* 57, no. 1 (February 28, 2022): 718–31, <https://doi.org/10.35741/issn.0258-2724.57.1.64>.

Corruption must be firmly established as a crime requiring firm and consistent legal action. It is therefore necessary for the President to issue clear instructions that the management of whistleblowing will fall under the Coordinating Minister, under the Corruption Eradication Commission, or directly under the President through the establishment of a task force for the prevention of bribery of law enforcement officials via a government regulation, a presidential regulation, or a presidential instruction. This would serve as evidence that the President desires a government free from bribery and corruption, which, through conventional criminal law approaches, has often proved insufficiently effective unless accompanied by strengthened accountability and firm mechanisms of accountability for state officials.³³ This integration can also be viewed from the perspective of public administration law, which aims to foster good governance encompassing transparency, accountability, and public oversight. Good governance is a vital instrument in preventing corruption. Oversight is not only carried out by the judicial and legislative bodies, but also by the public as part of public scrutiny of government administration, one example of which is this whistleblowing system.³⁴

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study found that institutional ego amongst law enforcement agencies can affect the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts within the Indonesian judicial system. The existence of separate whistleblowing mechanisms within the Corruption Eradication Commission, the Indonesian National Police, the Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia has led to fragmentation in reporting procedures, weak inter-agency coordination, overlapping jurisdictions, and inconsistent protection for whistleblowers. This fragmentation indicates that the current whistleblowing system is not yet functioning effectively as an integrated mechanism for controlling corruption in the judicial sector. This study further finds that the integration of whistleblowing systems requires not only technological coordination, but also harmonisation of legal frameworks, institutional interoperability, and clear accountability mechanisms amongst law enforcement authorities.

Based on these findings, this study recommends several institutional measures. Firstly, the government and the legislature could enact new legislation or comprehensive government regulations governing the integrated management of whistleblowing across all judicial law enforcement agencies. Secondly, law enforcement agencies must develop mutually integrated reporting and information-sharing mechanisms to ensure coordinated follow-up to corruption reports. Third, institutional standards regarding confidentiality, whistleblower protection, and mandatory response procedures must be uniformly applied across all judicial institutions. Finally, inter-institutional oversight mechanisms must be established to monitor

³³ Jupri Jupri, "Diskriminasi Hukum Dalam Pemberantasan Korupsi Politik Di Daerah," *Dialogia Iuridica: Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Dan Investasi* 11, no. 1 (November 19, 2019): 114–31, <https://doi.org/10.28932/di.viii.1997>.

³⁴ Sunaryo and Nur, "Legal Policy of Anti-Corruption Supervisor Design: A New Anti-Corruption Model in Indonesia."

coordination, prevent sectoral conflicts, and ensure accountability in the handling of corruption reports within the Indonesian judicial system.

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