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**Bureaucratic Cooptation in Program Evaluation:**

**A Comparation Case in Indonesia and South Korea**

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***Abstract***

*The research about government program evaluation mainly uses an impact assessment, but this research would use a meta-evaluation approach. The proposed research question is how the local government of Indonesia or the local bureaucracy evaluated their programs compared to South Korea. The method in this research is a comparative study between Indonesia dan South Korea, with data analysis from relevant documents. The result of the research proved that the evaluation patterns between programs seem similar. Both evaluation activities in South Korea and Indonesia tend to be dominated by their own bureaucracy; the difference is that South Korea used to conceptualize activities while Indonesia does not. Furthermore, the evaluation activities only did the formalism part, such as focusing on formal aspects rather than the program's aims.*

***Keywords:****bureaucratic cooptation; evaluation; formalism; Indonesia, South Korea*

***Abstrak***

*Berbeda dengan kebanyakan riset terkait evaluasi program pemerintah yang menggunakan penilaian dampak, penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan* meta-evaluation. *Rumusan masalah yang diajukan adalah bagaimana pemerintah lokal di Indonesia atau birokrasi lokal melakukan evaluasi terhadap programnya. Metode yang akan digunakan untuk menjelaskan adalah pendekatan studi komparasi, dengan pengambilan data dari analisis dokumen-dokumen yang relevan dengan topik yang diambil. Hasil dari penelitian ini membuktikan bahwa pola evaluasi antar program cenderung mirip. Baik di Korea Selatan maupun Indonesia, aktivitas evaluasi cenderung didominasi oleh birokrasi; perbedaannya adalah di Korea Selatan lebih cenderung terkonseptualisasi namun di Indonesia cenderung tidak akurat. Aktivitas evaluasi hanya dilakukan sebagai formalitas dengan aspek-aspek formal dari program tersebut dibandingkan benar-benar melakukan evaluasi terhadap tujuan dari program terkait.*

***Kata-kata kunci:*** *kooptasi birokrasi, evaluasi, formalisme, Indonesia, Korea Selatan*

**Introduction**

As we know, the study of public policy cannot be separated from assumptions about the process of public policy concern, which starts with formulation and ends with an evaluation. The public policy process consists of formulation, implementation, and evaluation, although there are many variations, as political scientists have identified (Dye, 1980, Ripley, 1985). This assumption makes the public policy process resemble a formulation, implementation, evaluation, and reformulation cycle.

Nevertheless, many policy formulations are rarely started from the results of the former policy evaluation. Some new programs or policies came from outside of the bureaucracy and implementer. Even the evaluation study tends to dominate by the Impact Assessment over how the government evaluates the programs or policies or the meta-evaluation question. It is interesting to uncover how the government has assessed the programs. Therefore, it is interesting to know how evaluation is done by bureaucracy due to past perspectives that bureaucracy is just an instrument of the politic. This paper tries to discover and prove that bureaucracy has its interest and resistance.

This paper will try to compare how the bureaucracy carries out evaluation. This proposition will show the notion that bureaucracy dominates the evaluation process. The authors compare South Korea with Indonesia because "... South Korea has had a relatively short history as a democracy and an even shorter history with democratic and modern public administration." (Yang & Torneo, 2016). Still, the country had impressive economic growth over the last few decades. Indonesia and South Korea became independent only three years apart; South Korea became independent in 1948, and Indonesia in 1945. At almost the same age, South Korea is currently included in the ranks of developed countries, while Indonesia is still included in the criteria for a developing country.

The concept of evaluation itself, therefore, is in a range of impact assessment to meta-evaluation. Most researchers on the evaluation subject have focused on the assessment of the impact of the policy, program, and project (Glasson & Wood, 2009; O'Faircheallaigh, 2009; Khanani, Elam, Hearn, Jones, and Maseru, 2010; Dietz & Pfund, 2012; Roth & Brooks-Gunn, 2015; Kreber & Brook, 2010; Shi, Zhang, and Rozelle, 2015). Even a variety of journals addressing this issue (e.g., Impact Assessment; Environmental Impact Assessment Review; Social Impact Report; Economic Assessment; as well as Policy Impact Assessment or Evaluation, Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, including Journal of Development Effectiveness). Nevertheless, some research on this evaluation tries to do meta-evaluation (among others are Russ-Eft and Preskill, 2008; Stufflebeam, 2011; Yu and Ma, 2015; Magura, 2012; Rutkowski, 2017). Therefore researchers on impact assessment of any policy, program, or project were being advanced or established while meta-evaluations have yet to.

Meta-evaluation refers to evaluating the evaluation efforts of any policy, program, or project. Therefore it is an approach to evaluation that provides an assessment of evaluation efforts. Meta-evaluation is essential because the assessment results are often neither proper (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Many kinds of empowerment evaluation research focus on the beneficiaries or target groups. For example, there is women's empowerment evaluation (Pereznieto and Taylor, 2014), rural empowerment (Datta and Singh, 2017), poverty empowerment (Essama-Nssah, 2010; Sinha, Parida, and Baruah, 2012; Khanna, Kochhar, and Palaniswamy, 2015). Even though they have many approaches to the research, the design still focuses on impact assessment. For example, Fetterman (2005) mentions the detailed empowerment evaluation, while others are developing a broader concept for empowerment, such as social impact identification (Dietz & Pfund, 2012).

The research would be an alternative reference to existing research on meta-evaluation efforts in empowerment programs, for example, to re-confirm the issue of intervention or evaluation failure (Magura, 2012). Indeed, we can design evaluation research accurately instead of in compliance with the existing regulations. The dimensions or aspects of the meta-evaluation are especially the evaluators and contents of the design of the evaluation towards policies, programs, or projects objectives or rationales. The issues in meta-evaluation are not merely the beneficiaries and parametric matters, but the actors or evaluators are also important. Therefore, the contribution of the research result will be a warning to the policy formulation, whether the bureaucracy as an implementer will do as the formulator wants. Therefore, the research aim is to prove who are dominant actors in evaluation, especially how bureaucracy domination plays in the process, both in Indonesia and South Korea.

**Research Methods**

The data sources of the research are evaluation documents in Indonesia randomly in a local evaluation case. This condition is due to the regulation in evaluation applied nationally. While in South Korea, the research consent to compare it by reports on local evaluation activities.

The research used secondary data or documents published in Indonesia and South Korea. The study was concerned with how bureaucracy evaluated the programs and the fundamental aims of the programs. Therefore, the first has a substance of who the evaluators are, while the second is whether they properly evaluate the essential purposes of the programs.

The researcher explored the relevant studies and documents in programs/ policies evaluation by bureaucracy. Those "data" will be analyzed descriptively.

**Results and Discussion**

**Brief description of the research location**

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| **Table 1**.A brief comparison of Indonesia and South Korea |
| **Description** | **Indonesia** | **South Korea** |
| The area | 1.90 million km² | 100.210 km² |
| Number of Provinces/Districts (Cities) | 9/82 (5) | 38/514 (98) |
| Population | 276.4 million (2021) | 51.74 million (2021) |
| Economic growth (21-22) | -0,70 – 3,51 – 5,01 – 5, 44 | -0,88 – 6,254 – 4,166 – 3,024 |
| Number of civil servants | 4.374.349 (2016) | 1.156.950 (2021) |
| Budget (2022) | 173806634.11 (2022) | 461.389.229.160.00 (2022) |
| Per Capita (2021) | US$ 4.349 ml | US$ 34,983ml |

Source: CEIC, n.d.

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Source: CEIC, n.d.

**Figure 1**.

Indonesia GDP Per Capita



Source: CEIC, n.d.

**Figure 2.**

South Korea GDP Per Capita

From the comparisons mentioned above, Indonesia is similar to South Korea. Still, in many respects, it turns out that they have more differences, especially in terms of volume and dimensions, both in terms of area, demographics, and fiscal.

**Brief description of the programs as an illustration in Indonesian Evaluation**

The program sample of the research is briefly described as follows. The PNPM is under controlled of the People Empowerment Office (Bapermas: Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat); the PKP is under controlled of the Food Counseling and Stock Office (BPKP: Badan Penyuluhan dan Ketahanan Pangan); and the PSPR-Gakin is under controlled of the Infrastructure Service (DPU: Dinas Pekerjaan Umum). The stakeholders of every program coverings some institutions, such as the Local Legislature (DPRD: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat); the Local Planning Board (Bappeda: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah); the Inspectorate Board (Inspektorat Kabupaten); and the NGOs (LSM: Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat), even the citizen or the people of the district as well. The program management by local government varied from the unit lines of local government, non-governmental organizations, including the citizen, and the local house of representatives' institution. We will find that coordination, as well as cooperation between them, is a crucial issue.

The PNPM offers services in the forms of a soft loan and a block grant for infrastructures; The PKP provides a block grant for the farming infrastructures and cheap rice stock in case the harvest fails, while the PSPR-Gakin services a block grant for restoration of the poor people's houses. While the local programs are planned by the *bappeda* and audited by the inspectorate, the legislature and the NGOs monitor the program's implementation. The national consultant fully controls the national program (the PNPM), and the local government units passively monitor the program's performance. From table 2, we can check that many institutions do an evaluation but never impact-assessment. Referring to Witkin (1995) and George and Cowan (1999), there was no needs assessment (formative evaluation) carried out, excepting the legislature in a weak formative and summative assessment.

We can prove that the programs evaluated by many institutions, but in reality, it has no impact on assessment. It complies with the guidelines as it has no specific or rigid goals. We found the evaluation efforts only for formalism because there are no conceptual impact evaluations. If consultants evaluate it through a contract, it tends to be formalism. Let us inspect the details of every program evaluation individually in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The data will be almost in evaluation programs in Indonesia generally.

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| **Table 2.**The Stakeholders of Evaluation Efforts of the Programs |
| No. | Stakeholders | Tasks on Programs Process |
| F | I | E | Os |
| 1. | Local Legislature | √ | - | √ | - |
| 2. | NGOs | - | - | √ | - |
| 3. | District Government | √ | √ | √ | - |
| 4. | LGUs: Planning Board | √ | - | √ | - |
| 5. | LGU: People Empowerment Board | - | - | √ | - |
| 6. | LGUs: Infrastructure Service | √ | √ | √ | - |
| 7. | LGUs: Food Security Board | √ | √ | √ | - |
| 8. | LGUs: Inspectorate | - | - | √ | - |
| 9. | Consultants | √ | √ | √ | - |
| 10. | Sub-district Government | - | - | √ | - |
| 11.  | Village Government | - | √ | √ | - |
| 12. | Target Group | - | - | - | B |
| 13. | Village People | - | - | - | - |

Legend: F = Formulation; I = Implementation;

E = Evaluation; O = Others; B = Beneficiaries

Source: obtained from relevant documents and interviews with relevant officers.

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| **Table 3.**Evaluation of PNPM |
| No. | Stakeholders | Tasks on Programs Process |
| F | I | E | Os |
| 1. | Local Legislature | - | - | √ | - |
| 2. | NGOs | - | - | √ | - |
| 3. | District Government | - | - | √ | - |
| 4. | LGUs: Planning Brd | - | - | √ | - |
| 5. | LGU: People Empowerment Brd | - | - | √ | - |
| 6. | LGUs: Infrastructure Service | - | - | √ | - |
| 7. | LGUs: Food Security Board | - | - | √ | - |
| 8. | LGUs: Inspectorate | - | - | √ | - |
| 9. | Consultants | √ | √ | √ | - |
| 10. | Sub-district Government | - | - | - | - |
| 11.  | Village Government | - | - | - | - |
| 12. | Target Group | - | - | - | B |
| 13. | Village People | - | - | - | - |

Legend: F = Formulation; I = Implementation;

E = Evaluation; O = Others; B = Beneficiaries

Source: obtained from relevant documents and interviews with relevant officers.

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| **Table 4.**Evaluation of PKP |
| No. | Stakeholders | Tasks on Programs Process |
| F | I | E | Os |
| 1. | Local Legislature | √ | - | √ | - |
| 2. | NGOs | - | - | √ | - |
| 3. | District Government | √ | √ | √ | - |
| 4. | LGUs: Planning Board | √ | - | √ | - |
| 5. | LGU: People Empowerment Board | √ | - | √ | - |
| 6. | LGUs: Infrastructure Service | √ | √- | √ | - |
| 7. | LGUs: Food Security Board | - | √ | √ | - |
| 8. | LGUs: Inspectorate | - | - | √ | - |
| 9. | Consultants | - | - | √ | - |
| 10. | Sub-district Government | - | - | √ | - |
| 11.  | Village Government | - | - | - | - |
| 12. | Target Group | - | - | - | B |
| 13. | Village People | - | - | - | - |

Legend: F = Formulation; I = Implementation;

E = Evaluation; O = Others; B = Beneficiaries

Source: obtained from relevant documents and interviews with relevant officers.

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| **Table 5.**Evaluation of PSPR-Gakin |
| No. | Stakeholders | Tasks on Programs Process |
| F | I | E | Os |
| 1. | Local Legislature | √ | - | √ | - |
| 2. | NGOs | - | - | √ | - |
| 3. | District Government | √ | √ | √ | - |
| 4. | LGUs: Planning Brd | √ | - | √ | - |
| 5. | LGU: People Empowerment Brd | - | - | √ | - |
| 6. | LGUs: Infrastructure Service | - | - | - | - |
| 7. | LGUs: Food Security Board | - | - | √ | - |
| 8. | LGUs: Inspectorate | - | - | √ | - |
| 9. | Consultants | - | √ | √ | - |
| 10. | Sub-district Government | - | - | - | - |
| 11.  | Village Government | - | √ | √ | - |
| 12. | Target Group | - | - | - | B |
| 13. | Village People | - | - | - | - |

Legend: F = Formulation; I = Implementation;

E = Evaluation; O = Others; B = Beneficiaries

Source: obtained from relevant documents and interviews with relevant officers.

*Evaluation of PNPM*

Evaluation of the national program is rigid and full of implementation documents; as such, implementation reports by sub-district operating units weekly, monthly, and annually. The evaluation, especially by words, is full of implementation documents such as program coverage, output delivery, and technical infrastructures built. There are no impact evaluations on how beneficiaries' changes become powerful and whether the beneficiaries are powerful by their involvement in the programs. This evaluation by existing institutions tends to be insignificant due to administrative matters. The PNPM has no specific and rigid goals but empowering people. Therefore, the program's evaluability assessment (Rutman, 1980) is very lax.

 The Program evaluators are the National Management Consultant (their local facilitators) and the NGO. They assess the program compliance with the guidance, but it has yet to use the impact-assessment concept. As they percept, the empowerment program is the same as the others, which should comply with the guidance. However, those evaluation activities tend to be administrative, so the real empowerment would be undiscovered because it does not impact assessment. Even though (empowerment) evaluation efforts are careful and complex, as well as more than administrative matters (Fetterman, 2005). This inspectorate evaluates merely fund expenditure or audit.

*Evaluation of PKP*

Unlike PNPM, the PKP program might be more convenient to assess its objectives than others due to the more rigid one in the guideline. Even though the evaluation tends to be more administrative than impact assessment efforts, the PKP evaluation was steady. The evaluators are the consultant, the sub-district implementer units, and the NGO (FLP), but it was an administrative rather than impact assessment. The inspectorate evaluates fund expenditures or audits, while the others have no significant evaluation efforts but comply with the guidance.

*Evaluation of PSPR-Gakin*

It is the same with the first two programs; the evaluators are a consultant; implementer units; and NGO (FLP), and they tend to fit with the guideline or administration. There are not any impact assessments, but administratively the program said so. The evaluation tends to monitor the house's rehabilitation process rather than assessing the impact of the new homes. All evaluators did the same work, while the inspectorate evaluated, especially in fund expenditure or audit.

Based on the brief description as an illustration above, basically in every region in Indonesia it is relatively the same, mainly due to the existence of national government regulations, such as regulations of the minister of finance, regulations of the minister of home affairs, or regulations of the coordinating ministry for people's welfare. Therefore, in general, evaluation is mainly carried out by the bureaucracy and refers more to formal aspects, not to the substance of each program.

**Brief description of the program evaluations in Indonesia and South Korea.**

In Indonesia, at a macro level, various programs have been evaluated by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), as illustrated in the following figure (Bappenas 2020).

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Source: Badan Perencaan Pembangunan Nasional (2020: 7)

**Figure 3.**

Information Line in Evaluation for National Action Plan

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Source: Badan Perencaan Pembangunan Nasional (2020: 11)

**Figure 4.**

Information Line in Monitoring for Local Action Plan

In South Korea, the bureaucracy in prime ministries also carries out macro evaluations. Still, there is a particular unit in the form of a government performance evaluation committee, as illustrated in the following figure.

Source: Kim, Younhee (2016)

**Figure 5.**

The Korean Government Performance Evaluation System

Thus, in Indonesia, it can be said that the evaluation carried out by the Indonesian bureaucracy has so far referred to compliance with existing regulations and tended to be formal aspects, not the substance of each program's objectives in the form of an impact assessment on each group. Targets, but more on the scope and status of the program in each target group. While in South Korea, it tends to be substance, as quoted from the following two figures.

Source: Hur, Mann Hyung (2013).

**Figure 6.**

The Transition of Policy Evaluation System



Source: Hur, Mann Hyung (2013).

**Figure 7.**

Evaluation Indicators of Top-down on Key National Policies

**Discussion: is the bureaucracy a dominant evaluator?**

In Indonesia, many institutions conduct an evaluation, but it is only for administrative purposes. In their article, Franklin and Ripley put the compliance concerning implementation studies in public administration. They tend to do safety first by adjusting the evaluations to the existing guidelines and rules. It is accountability and responsibility for budget expenditures. There are many rules to obey, such as Indonesia Government Rule No. 39/2007 of State/Local Financial Management, Government Rule No. 58/2005 of Regional Financial Management, and Rule of Finance Ministry No. 190/PMK.05/2012 of Payment Procedures of Budget implementation.

Likewise, in South Korea, evaluation activities are controlled by the bureaucracy, in this case, the Prime Minister. Program evaluation in South Korea was briefly reviewed by Kim (2016: 1-3), which shows the dominance of the bureaucracy through various ministries and program implementers in the field.

*“The Korean government has acted to embed performance-based evaluation systems across all levels of public agencies and public institutions after enacting the Government Performance Evaluation Act (GPEA) of 2001. ... to integrate various performance evaluation systems in 2006 ... in 2016. Self-evaluation is a mandatory performance evaluation conducted by individual central government agency evaluation committees. In contrast, specific evaluation is a supplemental tool of self-evaluation to be prepared by the Government Performance Evaluation Committee (GPEC) co-chaired by the Prime Minister’s Office. Self-evaluation focuses on each agency’s performance activities in relation to short-term policies or programs. The specific evaluation assesses each individual agency’s performance on mid- to long-term strategies directly linked with prioritized national policies.”*

Let us check the description of Indonesian evaluation; the dominant actor in evaluation would be the bureaucracy. They are the units of the local (district) government; the local planning board; the legislature; the inspectorate; and the sub-districts.

*The Units of Local Government.*

The evaluator of the program is the competent local government unit for the program implementation. The different units evaluate every program; PNPM is evaluated by the People Empowerment Office (Bapermas) and the Consultant; PKP by the Agency of Agriculture through the Center of Information and Food Security (BPKP); PSPR Gakin by the Agency of Infrastructure Services (DPU). It shows that the three agencies are weak coordination in the evaluation activities. Local government Units are dominant actors in every evaluation effort to implement the program, but there needs to be coordination in the evaluation design. As an informant said:

*“All programs evaluation that I know are the same, all have blanks to fill in and the important thing is that all expenses have accountability. In general, the specific objectives of the program are not self-made, the evaluation of all programs is relatively the same. For evaluations carried out by third parties, it is important that the budget allocated is in accordance with the evidence of expenditure. Each program is responsible for its implementation and evaluation”.* (interview by local officer in the People Empowerment Office (Bapermas: Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat), on 2nd Juli, 2018)

This condition happened due to their domination. The domination itself is embedded in the pre-formulation/issue-development and implementation stages of the policy, the programs, or the projects. In the sense of capabilities to design evaluation research through impact assessment, they do not have enough care due to their discretion power, and the evaluation resources are usually minimal (Dietz and Pfund, 2012: 137). Therefore, the local government has difficulties being an agent of change. It is for those who handle data on policies, programs, and projects, but they are more devoted to routine administrative work. It perhaps looks like what Triwibowo & Martha (2021) said as a pragmatist approach to many of Indonesia's policies.

*The Consultants*

The one doing the objective evaluation is a hired management consultant by contract to evaluate the programs. They professionally took up procurement as the third party for PNPM, PKP, and PSPR-Gakin. They do administrative evaluation as such coverage of the target group and the infrastructures built rather than assessing the impact in the target group. Even though they are external to the local government, they must do what the local government wants as a report template. They have the potency to be an agent of change to reform evaluation design conducted. They might be like the external government performance evaluation for the government's external accountability in China (Yu and Ma, 2015). The consultants, usually called management consultants, carry out the program evaluations under a contract with the Local Government and are approved by the local legislature. The external evaluator is strategic, but their works have to match the local government's desire. The potency to be an agent of change has not realized due to they are not independent. Their charge is provenanced by the local government so that they cannot diverge from the mainstream evaluation that is usually done.

*The Local Planning Board*

The role of the Local Planning Board in program evaluation, specifically for development programs, needs to be more significant. No data from interviews, document analysis, and observation showed that the Local Planning Board directly evaluates the programs. Some of their efforts are hiring third parties, and the evaluation research results could be more helpful. The board remained credible even though they hired research consultants to do an evaluation. Therefore the board should be a dominant actor in evaluation design. They are cooptated by consultants' presentation in evaluation reports rather than strictly technically reviewing every evaluation research proposal and the report by the consultants.

Compared to other local government units, the board's role in the evaluation is very strategic due to the institution that formally coordinates the local government's policy, programs, and project plans. Nevertheless, it turns out this institution is very limited in its capacity, both the quantity and the quality of human and other resources. Therefore, the institution tends to coordinate all the planning activities in various local government units. In this context, the board can empower the external's evaluations to impact assessment. Still, there will be a conflict of interest when handling both planning and evaluating the same policies, programs, or projects.

*The Legislature*

There was no direct involvement of the legislature in evaluating the programs, but they accidentally do as such field visits in some program areas. Under formal responsibilities, the legislatures tend to take a part of bureaucracy or consultants through the bargaining process in their discussion regarding the program implementation and evaluation. Since the legislature politically has the authority to evaluate the whole programs implemented by the local budget, they could be smart evaluators. So that enhance the role of the parliament in program evaluation is an opportunity to empower evaluation efforts at the local level.

The institution's position is crucial in the local government's existing policies, programs, or projects. Nevertheless, they are weak in the data and concept of evaluation. Furthermore, the institutions often follow executive arguments when allocating local budgets rather than invading them with new evaluation ideas. Their evaluation activities tend to glance in observation to the field of infrastructures rather than impact assessment. Therefore, the institutions sometimes use the services of a third party or a consultant to evaluate any policies, programs, or projects as long as the executives have not. The institution requires a measurable criterion for an assessment of the program results easier.

*The Inspectorate.*

The inspectorate evaluates as an audit for government expenditures. The unit tends to audit some budget expenditures but has yet to do any impact assessment. This institution has the potency to be a reliable evaluator instead of an accounting business. So far, the inspectorate has focused on expenditures rather than the benefit of fund allocation.

The inspectorate would be a reliable evaluator due to its authority than just only auditing. In case the local government hires external services or a third party to conduct an evaluation. This institution has the potency to obtain the authority to collaborate with third parties. Therefore, it can be a leading sector for managing the evaluation of all policies, programs, and projects through the extension of its authority and function.

*The Non-Government Organization*

The forum was not an inventory of specific results of the programs; instead, it monitored the programs implemented in the district. Establishing the platform is very good due to becoming an external evaluator such as very relevant to participatory ideas in evaluation (Larsen, 2017). However, this forum was funded by the local government, so it became less independent. Its very existence depends on the local government concerned. Therefore, the work results will be consistent with the willingness of the local government concerned. This institution has the potential to be an independent evaluator, but resource weakness is an obstacle. Therefore, due to the idea of community participation, it will be strategic when becoming a partner of the board to conduct an impact assessment of the existing policies, programs, or projects.

*The Sub-Districts*

In this case, sub-districts consist more administrative aspects than others. It is to obtain copies of the reports of implemented programs in their territory. Therefore, these sub-districts have not had the potential to be evaluators but help administratively manage relevant data. Then, the evaluation efforts were undertaken by other local government units, particularly the district inspectorate. The resources of the sub-district can assist the inspectorate in collecting the relevant data.

*The Implementer of the Program*

The program implementer has to evaluate both the target group of the program (beneficiaries) and the program's project location (or activities). They must know the results of the program implemented, but they did administratively rather than the real program achievement as such the program's aims. It is parallel with the work on five cases in Mexico about characteristics of local government on policy or program process, the low-trust bureaucracy (Peeters, Jimenez, O'Connor, Rojas, Galindo, & Tenorio, 2018).

The implementers in the field, especially for programs or projects, mostly come from externs of governments, so they ought to be independent and have the potential for evaluation. However, there may be a conflict of interest due to them as both implementers and evaluators of the program. They are a possibility of resistance to the negative results and a decline to affect their performance adversely. Even so, they have relevant data for the evaluation efforts. Therefore, the implementers tend to be a source of data rather than policy, program, or project evaluators.

*The People*

The involvement of the people in evaluation efforts remained a bit, whereas they are the beneficiaries and ought to be the owner of every program implemented. In this context, Russ-Eft and Presskill (2008) have been offering solutions to solve people's participation problem in evaluation design conducted. The people's participation in the evaluation is a potential solution to enhance the effectiveness of the evaluation design. Even Larsen (2017) argued that indigenous participation (in impact assessment) is most meaningful. Communities, in general, are not certain target groups of some affirmative programs; therefore, they could be evaluators effectively. It is due to their independence as well as a legitimate position. The community can be a reliable partner for the inspectorate or the planning board in the evaluation effort. They knew better than others because their works are closest to the target group, and they might be able to support in distributing the benefits of the policies, programs, or projects.

*The Evaluation Design*

The weak evaluation design in Indonesia might determine the un-useful evaluation rather than the weakness in the activities; the issue is mainly in the format. No improved design is conducted, but a formal aspect of the program, such as the coverage and the expenditures. Authentic impact assessment in governmental evaluation remains optional rather than the mandatory content of the evaluation design, as such weakness and uncertain statements of program objectives and evaluation criteria in the program's guidance so that the results or impacts of the programs are un-measurable. Therefore, if impact assessment is a mandatory evaluation design, there will be a policy issue for the government. Therefore, many regulations regarding the agenda should be adjusted.

There are many kinds of evaluation design, such as Vanclay (2012) offered international principles for social impact assessment; qualitative evaluation (Kaiser and Rusch, 2015); interpretive methods (Yildirim, Ozdemir and Sezgin, 2013); even ethnographic methods (Adato, 2008), are suitable. In this sense, Migura (2012) said that an intervention might be effective, but no proper evaluation design was conducted. Moreover, the substance of the evaluation remains nebulous, whereas the core concepts of social impact assessment as power (and empowering) are people needed (Esteves, Franks, and Vanclay, 2012).

**South Korea's Experience in Evaluation**

Although, in some respects, there are sharp differences between Indonesia and South Korea, in the evaluation activities, it is possible to identify some similarities and differences between the two. In South Korea, the bureaucracy is also dominant in the evaluation system as quoted below:

*“South Korea's experiences with an NPM- and ReGo-inspired system may be relevant to developing democracies planning to establish their performance management and evaluation systems after passing through long periods of authoritarianism. This may also be relevant to emerge democracies whose bureaucracies are still centralized, top-down in structure, and influenced by a culture of hierarchy.”* (Yang &. Torneo, 2016).

However, the evaluation system in South Korea is developing relatively fast, both for government performance and various existing policies. Not to compare the two experiences in evaluation between Indonesia and South Korea, but rather to find out the evaluation activity in South Korea. The evaluation system has developed rapidly in the last three decades in state-owned enterprises. The evaluation method used initially was only goal performance, growing so that now, for evaluation, goal performance is used to reach long-term target suggestions. Even qualitative indicators have been used well. (Park, J., J. Kim, and C. J. Kim. 2019).

Byeon (2017) identifies the development of an evaluation system that applies in South Korea, especially for Research and Development programs, from 1982 to 2006, from just project evaluation to performance evaluation. Although this performance-based evaluation was widespread in the past two decades, the consistent use of this concept in South Korea has worked well. This is evidenced by the various achievements of its economic development.

Over the past two decades, Park (2006) has noted that the legislature can control the bureaucracy so that bureaucracy does not seem to want to do the evaluation. It was quoted below:

*“Legislators involve in the "fire-alarm" monitoring of the bureaucracy while interceding with the bureaucracy for performing constituency service. Administrative procedures serve as ex-ante means of controlling the bureaucracy. (p. 200)”*

However, if the regime variable is analyzed, the results may be different as quoted from the same article, “…bringing the president as another principal into perspective can make the analysis more realistic and valid than otherwise.”(p. 200).

From South Korea's little experience in evaluation activities, the similarity with Indonesia is the dominance of the bureaucracy in evaluation. However, South Korea is more robust in the consistency of the evaluation concept, so evaluation activities are really for measuring performance, not co-opting these activities. Therefore, assessment Frameworks for Improving School Outcomes are stated as follows.

*“The assessment is intended to review the entirety of the education system including school conditions, curriculum and learning outcomes. For this, core indicators have been developed at the national level to tackle the limitation of the exhaustive, segmental and policy‐oriented previous indicators, and to assess the school organ from a more comprehensive perspective. These are “common indicators” that are applied to all schools nationwide, which set forth visions for ideal schools and nationally shared directions for school innovation. But when indicators are developed only at the national level, they hold limitation in reflecting the various educational aspects of the local level. Therefore, in order to meet the demands of local education, metropolitan/provincial offices of education select an additional set of “self‐developed indicators” and use them to assess how well schools are implementing and addressing the core education policies and issues of the offices.”* (OECD, 2010).

From the part of the OECD review above, we know that the evaluation criteria in program evaluation are critical even though there were two indicators: joint and self-developed (by local institutions). We can't find this thing in Indonesia's local bureaucracy as the evaluation activities cooptate as routine works.

**CONCLUSION**

Firstly, the principal evaluators of the implementation of development programs are NGOs and the implementers of the program themselves. Whereas the responsible and accountable institutions to the programs evaluation are the local legislatures due to the formulator and legislator of the budget; the inspectorate due to the auditor of the program activities; and, of course, the people as the external actors who have authority and legitimation to ask government accountability. It shows that the performance of the legislator as a formulator, the people as a citizen, and the inspectorate as an auditor are still weak (Merton's bureaucratic personality). This weakness is shown, among others, in the intention of the field, both in the community and the beneficiaries and in the location where the program or activity is carried out. Their weakness in evaluation is an answer to the asking of why evaluation is un-useful as far.

Secondly, the concept of impact assessment is still extraneous and disconnected from the program documents due to the programs' goals still needing to be described rigidly. The program objectives broadly described the result that the evaluator's difficulty measuring the real one (the evaluability assessment is fragile). The guideline of the programs is merely on the administrative aspect, whereas if the program documents clearly and measurably what the program objectives are, both short and long-term, then the evaluator possibly measures the program outcomes or impacts. When faced with strict budgetary rules from the government, the lack of discretion of the program implementers and evaluators will lead their behaviors to prioritize administrative, especially financial aspects, rather than the substance of the program's objectives, as Riggs (1964) called formalism. Even though Rosyadi (2021) differs slightly from Indonesia and Thailand, Riggs' formalism context is the same. Financial mismanagement can even be criminal if deemed detrimental to the state's funds. Therefore, evaluators tend to be oriented towards program documents that are not rigid and measurable, which may be called a grey area.

Thirdly, the issue of those weaknesses both of the primary evaluator and evaluation design should be addressed to the national level government, to be a recommendation as a policies paper in up-grading the relevant government rules for enhancing public accountability.

Fourthly, what did the local government or bureaucracy look absorbent when evaluating their entire programs? They do as they should do by many regulations precisely. Instead, they are not an instrument but are subject to self-values for themselves. They should have had a distinctive spirit for the people through their evaluation activities, but they did not. The formerly (development) programs are just stories, even histories. They have no succeeded record as the following programs and what the bureaucracy did, of course, as such a real cooptation in the policy or program as their routine works. The term cooptation is adapted from Seznick's (1949) Cooptative Mechanism by an organization to the circumstance. It is a firm different from South Korea's practice in evaluation.

Finally, Both in Indonesia and South Korea, the evaluation activities are dominated by bureaucracy (in terms of the executive branch). Still, in Indonesia, bureaucracy tends to cooptated the activities as routine bureaucratic works (*formalism*). In contrast, in South Korea, the movements tend to be substantive evaluations (evaluation activities are really for measuring performance, not co-opting these activities).

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