

The Political and Economic Impacts of Rohingya Refugee Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities of Humanitarian Intervention in Post- Conflict Space

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Abstract

The crisis of Rohingya refugee has been agitating bilateral relations among South East Asian and South Asian countries particularly Bangladesh. Beside the massive influxes of ingoing refugees, the crisis contributes to a massive economic decline in addition to poor assistantship of their host countries. Building from these, this article aims at examining the local community integration policy jointly delivered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) together with the governments of host countries in promoting cultural reunification between refugees and native population of Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Moreover, this article seeks to explore the way refugee navigates destination based on sociological, anthropological, and geographical resemblance in which encompasses religious, ethnical, historical, and economic considerations. Methodologically, this article is deliberated through a mix qualitative method where discourse and content analysis are being employed respectively. As a result, this article signifies the inherent legitimacy of cultural and religious institutions that breaches the pre-existing legal restraint as well as weighing up its supremacy against the government's interest and political agenda. Eventually, the ultimate outcome of this research draws the process on how refugees and native inhabitants shapes reciprocal relationship in times of international rejection and how they influence the development of destination countries economically and politically.

Keywords: Bangladesh, community integration, humanitarian intervention, Indonesia, Rohingya refugee

Abstrak

Krisis pengungsi Rohingya telah mengagitasi hubungan bilateral antara negara-negara Asia Tenggara dan Asia Selatan khususnya Bangladesh. Selain masuknya pengungsi yang masuk secara besar-besaran, krisis tersebut berkontribusi pada penurunan ekonomi yang sangat besar di tambah penerimaan negara destinasi yang buruk. Berdasarkan fakta diatas, artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengulik kebijakan integrasi pengungsi Rohingya dengan masyarakat local (local community integration) yang dilakukan United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) dan International Organization for Migration (IOM) dalam mempromosikan reunifikasi kultural antara pengungsi dan penduduk asli Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia dan Thailand. Selain itu, artikel ini mengeksplorasi strategi pengungsi dalam menavigasi tujuan eksodus mereka berdasarkan kesamaan sosiologis, antropologis, dan geografis yang mencakup pertimbangan agama, etnis, sejarah, dan ekonomi. Secara metodologis, artikel ini dideliberasi menggunakan metode kualitatif campuran yang dianalisis berdasarkan diskursus dan konten literatur. Kesimpulannya, migrasi pengungsi Rohingya telah memvalidasi legitimasi lembaga budaya dan agama yang dengan leluasa menerobos batas batas hukum yang berlaku serta menunjukkan supremasinya terhadap pemerintah dan agenda politik dalam negeri. Hasil akhir dari penelitian ini menjelaskan secara detil bagaimana pengungsi dan penduduk asli berhasil menciptakan hubungan timbal balik saat terjadi penolakan dari berbagai pemerintah lokal dan bagaimana pengungsi Rohingya mempengaruhi perkembangan ekonomi dan politik di negara tujuan.

Kata kunci: Bangladesh, Indonesia, integrasi komunitas, intervensi kemanusiaan, pengungsi Rohingya

INTRODUCTION

At the outset, it is obvious for refugees upon fleeing abroad to have the capability in measuring challenges and opportunities in destination countries (Alchatib, 2019). This grounds to their inherent motivation to seek safety and a better livelihood (Ali, 2016). This basic assumption led their journey to Malaysia, an Islamist, moderate well-developed country in South East Asia. Malaysia depicts a peaceful coexistence between Malay (Moslem), Indian (Hindu) and Chinese (Buddhist) (Pamini & Othman, 2013). For overall general migrants, employment and residency are relatively reachable. Native Malaysians are adapted to cultural diversity and considerably hospitable to migrants. However, the issue revolves on Rohingya population's status as "stateless" refugee (A. Chowdhury, personal communication, November 23, 2017). In this case, the Government has different and rather coercive policy measurement. Malaysian government has been widely pronounced as an anti-refugee administration as it refuses to ratify the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee and its 1967 Protocol (Mutsvara & Kugonza, 2020). This premise was then reinforced by Malaysian Prime Minister's rejection speech for refugee arrival during ASEAN Summit (Xiong, 2015). As many other countries imposed including in Malaysia, Rohingya refugees were being sheltered marginally with minimum foods and medical provision. Since its first inception, Malaysian government has not recognized Rohingya as refugees but rather as illegal migrants and stateless persons. Malaysia's authority imposed a strict surveillance policy which restrained them for mobilization and employment (A. Chowdhury, personal communication, November 23, 2017).

Before reaching Malaysia, Rohingya refugee commonly travels to south Thailand as a country of transit. For refugees, it is perceived safer to enter northern Malaysia through Hatyai or Songkhla, a city in

southern Thailand where majority of natives are Moslem instead of embarking a deadly journey through Andaman sea (Ullah, 2016). Therefore, the expectation of hospitable treatment arises. However, Thai government had anticipated this migration with a pre-emptive *plot-twist* (Danish Immigration Services, 2011). The government of Thailand has been struggling vehemently to exterminate Islamist insurgency group in south Thailand believes Rohingya refugees will be additional war commodity for rebellion group once integration between Moslem Rohingya and Moslem Pattaya (Southern Thai Population) was formed (The Arakan Project, 2016). Therefore, it imposes a coercive *push-back policy* whereby Thai government obliged military patrols in Andaman Sea to push back 'boat people refugees' to ocean once the boats arrived in Thai's land. Moreover, reportedly, Thai government imposed extreme approach by using sea traffickers to capture refugees approaching to Thai water and blackmailed them to pay a *fee of mercy* to be able to cross to Malaysia. Those who failed to fulfil the demand have been sexually exploited, executed and graved in south Thailand following the discovery of Refugee mass graveyard by UNHCR. The journey of Rohingya refugee to Thailand and Malaysia is the example of violent destination for refugees. Eventually, economic, residential and social integration prospects are not sufficient to succeed migration for stateless refugees. This article argues a sufficient degree of political will from host government and international agency intervention are the most fundamental tool to provide safe migration and resettlement process particularly in case of acute and unsolved refugee migration.

Literature Review

The primary sources of this research represented by a collection of UNHCR research projects and related articles studying the application and key provisions

of the asylum procedure in host countries. Among other pieces are the following; *Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law and Practices*. This literature encompasses holistic technical details regarding the application procedure of asylum and a mechanism to receive the status of refugee. Another important piece to be taken into account is a working paper by Nicholas R. Michinski and Thomas G. Weiss (2016) on *International Organization for Migration and the UN System: A Missed Opportunity*. This literature will assist at distinguishing mandates, functions, as well as specialized capacities of UNHCR and IOM and how strategic partnership among them operates in a similar crisis situation. Furthermore, to identify whether UNHCR possess the capacity to enlarge its function as an overall migration manager, it is crucial to have a deep overview on *Refugee Protection Meets Migration Management: UNHCR as a Global Police of Populations*, an article written by Stephan Scheel and Philipp Ratfisch (2014). Another essential pieces of this kind will also be utilized among other things: *The Politics and Discourse of Migrant Return: The Role of UNHCR and IOM in the Governance of Return* by Anne Koch (2017). These organizational archives and related readings are to be further elaborated on the prepared in-depth interview transcript with UNHCR and IOM to obtain a clearer picture regarding the current situation of Rohingya refugees and how their joint operation allows mobilization and prospect the status of economic migrant for the refugees.

Research Method

This research is addressed in a *mix qualitative method*. The methodological approach is divided into a series of in-depth interview and content analysis to public and semi-confidential archives. First and foremost, primary data will be generated from a series of individual in-depth interviews that will be convened with

different renowned experts, public figures, and practitioners whose work encompasses the issue on refugee management in general and Rohingya as a historical society from South Asia and Southeast Asian regions. Second of all, another form of primary data will also be galvanized through content analysis of existing reports, seminars, workshops and archives from corresponding international and regional governmental organizations directly and indirectly discussed in this article.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Navigating Destination to Flee

Rohingya refugee crisis is in nature different with some of the largest refugee crisis such as those of Syrian refugee crisis (ongoing) and Rwandan refugee crisis (1994). The population of Rohingya has been marginalized for centuries even before Myanmar existed as a sovereign state (Ullah, 2011). They crossed multiple borders endlessly due to consistent external rejection and that they are intractable which means there is no visible direct solution for permanent resettlement and safe repatriation (Chowdhury, 2020). Rohingya refugees had travelled to a number of countries with different economic and social backgrounds. However, not all migrations are success and even most primary destination countries gave violent journeys to Rohingya population as refugees (Alchatib, 2019). Based on the recent influx from moving average period of 2015 to 2018, Rohingya refugees have specific preferred destination as embodied in the following paragraphs.

Geographical Proximity

Based on the recent statistic, Bangladesh is amongst the most populous destination for Rohingya refugee. One of the primary reasons is due to its geographical position as the closest neighbor to Myanmar as it is the nearest point to flee in times of sudden military strikes (Green & Macmanus, 2015). In extent to its

geographical proximity, Bangladesh is also a trans-regional gate between South East Asia and South Asia (Alchatib, 2019). Therefore, fleeing to Bangladesh is the fastest and the most spontaneous option with opportunity to flee further to South Asian countries such as Pakistan and India whose economy are relatively stable and opportunities for employment are considerably higher compared to Bangladesh who is still struggling to build its economy amidst the issue of extreme poverty and major economic decline since the first mass refugee influx in 2015 (Ahmed, 2010). Furthermore, travelling to Bangladesh is less-violent as compared to Malaysia and Thailand through sea that is harmful with a consequence of being the subject of human trafficker (Klug, 2014). To this point onwards, safety in Bangladesh is guaranteed by the presence of UNHCR whose set up refugee camps with provisions of food and medical facilities. It is also assisted by IOM to maintain illegal refugees mobilizing beyond UNHCR camps (Taylor & Rafferty-Brown, 2010).

Anthropological Resemblance

In Bangladesh, there has been over 600,000 refugees. Based on the recent update who have crossed the country border. However, only around 28,000 refugees are registered in UNHCR camps due to the imbalance of Refugee's inflow and camp's capacity to accommodate all refugees. This unorganized mass mobilization had enabled Rohingya refugees to travel freely across the country to seek mineral jobs. This free mobilization is supported by similar language and ethnicity of native Bangladeshi and Rohingya refugees who belongs to the same tribal background that is the Bengali (A. Chowdhury, personal communication, November 23, 2017). In addition, due to racial similarity and sense of solidarity among them it is relatively easy for refugees to blend with native population. Therefore, local community integration can be

operated naturally in this case. This natural integration makes it difficult for IOM and local authority to identify illegal migrants outside UNHCR camps.


Beyond the catastrophe in Thailand and Malaysia, Rohingya refugees received spontaneous hospitality in Aceh province, a northern territory of Indonesia (Klug, 2014). Differ from Malaysia and Thailand, local Indonesian Acehnese refuses to obey military order to abandon refugee on shore (Taylor & Rafferty-Brown, 2010). The natural gesture of local Indonesian Acehnese can be derived from two religious and historical aspects. First of all, Indonesia is the world's largest Moslem-majority country and Aceh province is an autonomous region governed by *sharia law*. The vast majority of Rohingya refugees are Moslem and so as the native population. The safety of Rohingya refugees is guaranteed not only by the authority but also by the natives. Therefore, Indonesia is an ideal destination to temporarily resettled before going for third-country resettlement (Alchatib, 2019). Secondly, rescuing Rohingya refugees who sink in Andaman sea is more than religious solidarity among local Indonesian Acehnese, it is also a tribute to commemorate international humanitarian response during the tragedy of tsunami which stroke Aceh in 2004 (Klug, 2014). Therefore, providing egalitarian space for Rohingya refugee is a reflection of religious solidarity, a tribute to humanitarian responds the international community contributed to reestablish the then-Indonesia's Aceh civilization (Klug, 2014). Based on the exposure above, local community integration can be accelerated through cultural, religious, historical and racial resemblance. It is also the most effective aspect to allow immediate local community integration in times of global political and economic shift.

Economic and Residential Opportunity

The most desired option for Rohingya refugees is migrating to an economically

advanced country for permanent living and employment (Gaffar, 2018). In this regard, a third country resettlement after temporarily resided in transiting countries such as Bangladesh and Indonesia have been deemed an ideal option (Oversea Development Institute, 2016). Nevertheless, advanced economies are highly selective in receiving refugees. In such a case, Australia

is most preferred destination with several waves of refugees were transferred to the country (Zayzda & Wijayanti, 2016). However, due to the dynamic shift of global economy noted by the US-China trade war, Australia has closed its door permanently by constantly modifying migration and permanent residential policies particularly towards refugees (Belot, 2017).



Source: UNHCR, 2020.

Figure 1.
UNHCR Migration Statistics of Refugee, IDP's and Asylum Seeker in Indonesia


Migration to Indonesia: Statistics, Geopolitics and Culture Factors

In the recent statistics, Indonesia has been occupied by over 260 million populations made the country the fourth most populated nation in the world (World Meters, 2020). Indonesia stood as the largest archipelago in the world consisting of over 17 thousand islands with total land areas 1.811.570 km² stretched from the northern Aceh to the southern Papua. The overall length of these lands is closely equivalent to the distance from London to Ankara in a line (Anwar, 2005). Indonesia is potentially becoming the new world's

maritime axis due to a massive gross development on fishery and maritime industries (Sadewa et al., 2020). Circulated by South China Sea in the south and situated amidst the Pacific Ocean, made it the most strategic destination for migration in South East Asia (Acharya, 2014). It was profoundly proven since 2002, when over 7.500 war victims from Afghanistan continued to arrive to seek for immediate protection and rehabilitation (UNHCR, 2016). Moreover, in the recent case, since 2015, A massive number Rohingya refugees are continuously fueling the southern province of Aceh after the grand "blood

bath” execution tragedy in Rakhine State of Myanmar (Ty, 2019). This was also openly welcomed by the host population as a compulsory act of solidarity (Klug, 2014) . This hospitality was later supported by the fact that Indonesia is the world’s largest Moslem majority nation and Aceh is its Islamic autonomous region where the governance ruled by sharia law (Zayzda & Wijayanti, 2016). Thus, it conclusive enough that religious bond may transcend the limitation of legal boundaries as reflected in the unconditional reception by the Indonesia’s side of Aceh.

Figure 1 on the headline explains the consistency of Indonesia in receiving different types of migrants mainly the refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (IDP’s). Moreover, refugee as explained in 1951 Refugee Convention are individuals granted complementary forms of protection and those enjoying temporary protection by hosting country is comparatively high in Indonesia (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2013).



Source: UNHCR, 2020.

Figure 2.
Refugee Migrants in Indonesia as of 2016

Refugee Migration in General

Historically, Indonesia was not one of the signatories in the 1951 Refugee Convention this is due to the slow-progressing economic building after its independent in 1945 and a question of geographical space to afford rooms for migrants (Alchatib, 2019). However, the above chart (Figure 2) explains a relatively progressive outcome. Despite its fluidity, since 1980 Indonesia has been consistent in providing rooms for refugee raising it to the number of 15 million refugees in 1990 before slowly declining from 1995 to 2015. This was largely due to the effect of economic crisis the country had to suffer which directly impacted its migration

policy. However, at the beginning of 2015, the percentage consistently experienced a gradual increase to the present time.


Comparatively, Indonesia is the most progressive host in South East Asia in comparison to Thailand and Malaysia as the country was firm to issue a decree on the protection of refugees and the prohibition to expel refugee to the origin countries (The Arakan Project, 2016). This decree represents the country’s commitment to *Non-Refoulement* principle within the convention in honor of international customary law (Tobing, 2017).

Asylum Seeker Migration

Asylum seekers according to UNHCR, are individuals who sought international protections as refugees however the status is not given yet. The percentage of asylum seekers is comparatively lower than refugees. Nevertheless, it was a huge task for Indonesia as the situation of asylum seekers on their way to Indonesia became protracted (Ali, 2016). Since the beginning of 2000, majority of asylum seekers spent around USD 5.000 to 10.000 for smuggler's service to travel a risky journey to Indonesia (Pamini & Othman, 2013). Asylum seekers are the main targets of illegitimate authorities and smugglers whose used blackmail and bribery to earn money from asylum seekers. This was the

reason the volume of asylum seekers remained constant in the course of 20th.

In the late of 2014, the situation for both refugees and asylum seekers started to change when the Indonesian government enact a bureaucracy reform in which corrupt officials were expelled from the government duties (Anwar, 2005). Firm sentences were also charged vehemently to illegal traffickers as Indonesian government was highly determine to preserve its maritime sovereignty (Zayzda & Wijayanti, 2016). Meanwhile, Indonesian president, Joko Widodo used his prerogative power to enable special treatment to refugees by granting refugee cards, establishing shelters and provides livelihood provisions (Utami & Saleh, 2018).



Source: UNHCR, 2018.

Figure 3.
Asylum Seeker Statistics in Indonesia (3 March 2018)

The Paradox of Community Integration in Indonesia: Between Policy and Hospitality

Aside from its strategic geopolitical situation, Indonesia is also known as a migrant-friendly nation where over 13.000 migrants from Myanmar and Afghanistan have been hosted at the present time. This integration was enabled because the local population rooted to the principle of "Pancasila" (The Five Foundations) and "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" (Unity in Diversity) (Utami & Saleh, 2018). Indonesians people are identically known as culture-influenced society with a solid belief and exposure to culture, tradition, and religion. Therefore, as religious population, the people are highly attached to moral norms and the value of

humanity as it was also presented in its national constitution which mentioned its obligation to contribute to the "world's peace".

Naturally, local community integration in Indonesia can be determined as a natural process of integration due to the society constant acceptance even when military officials committed several setbacks (Klug, 2014). It was later proven in May 2015, when Rohingya refugees started to flee to Indonesia around 14.000 sink from boats and were rescued off the coast of Aceh (Sari & Hidayat, 2018). However, military institution seems unsure how to handle them. Instead of rescuing the refugees, soldiers tend to send them off to shore to avoid "additional problem" but

local Acehnese or Indonesian Moslem society in the south resist to send them back to ocean in the hand of smugglers but offered them place at their home and treated them as their own brothers (Nandyatama & Tricesaria, 2017). These spontaneous local hospitalities made migrants feel at home in Indonesia and avoidant to third country resettlement (Sari & Hidayat, 2018).

At the very outset of this crisis, despite the tremendous local community acceptance, Indonesia's central government still has not drawn any clear direction due to the limited capacity of Aceh provincial scheme as the Jakarta instruction is just to grant temporary sheltering for one year (Putri, 2017). Meanwhile, the unbreakable bond shared between Moslems in Aceh and the Rohingya Moslem remain stronger. It left the government no feasible option but to provide a larger and lengthier space for Rohingya refugees (Putri, 2017). This is a solid prove on how religious measure can be an essential tool to accelerate integration in a multi-religious country.

The constant integration between Moslems in Aceh and Rohingya refugees had resulted a successful pressure to the government whereby it passed *Presidential Regulation No.125 on the Treatment of Foreign Refugees*. This was an appealing initial step to provide legal framework on refugee management. This is in line with the general outline in the 1951 Refugee Convention which is assisting refugee management at national level (Chowdhury, 2019). Nevertheless, despite its compelling narrative, this regulation only focuses on emergency response measure that is still far from mitigating the prominent challenges of resettlement.

Probability of Local Inhabitants Domination to Migrants

To this date there is no feasible challenge for integration in Indonesia as the local culture shapes the hospitality of the local society to be an openly welcoming host

for any type of migrants. In addition, intrigue for domination from local population almost absolutely absence during the emergency response as largest amount of local population favored local integration on the basis of religious similarities and cultural connectivity between Rohingya and local community.

The only limitation among the locals and migrants are the ability to access formal education, and larger health facilities and work permit (Fathun, 2018). Therefore, a comprehensive partnership among broader stakeholders is required to accelerate welfare system and provision to the vulnerable group of society.

It is important to note that Indonesia is only a transit country whereby governments granted only up to 6 years living permit while waiting for third country resettlement (Alchatib, 2019). Given the tightened immigration policies in Australia and the United States, Indonesian government has to be prepared for a longer transit period (Listriani & Rosmawati, 2020). This is due to the fact that in a short period, Indonesia will face a booming demographic bonus that is predicted to occur between 2020 and 2025 (Nazamuddin, 2010). Therefore, providing sufficient space for citizens and migrants is its next challenge.

Remittance and Revenue Analysis: The Case of Indonesia And Bangladesh


One of the largest impacts of Rohingya forced migration is the outflow of domestic citizens and human resources. While overseas employment is an obvious and yet organized trend in Bangladesh, it is evident that Bangladeshi expats had contributed significantly to the development and sustainability of domestic growth (Chaudet, 2018). Bangladesh become one of the largest recipients of foreign remittance in South Asia in the last three years (2013-2015) competing with India and Pakistan. The trend between 2005 to 2015 draws a surge disparity whereby the country earned

USD 15 billion larger than the last decade. As of the latest survey in 2015, Bangladesh delivered over half a million overseas workers mainly to Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Korea and several Persian Gulf countries. The number accounts for one fifth of the overall labor force in the country (Wankel & Hipsher, 2012).

According to the latest report of the World Bank, from overall 556.000 overseas workers in 2016, Indonesia has been the largest exporter of foreign labors to Saudi Arabia (13%), Malaysia (55%), and Hongkong (6%). The labor forces were also quite dominant in Singapore (5) and Taiwan (10%) (Purnamasari, 2017). The contribution of Indonesian migrant workers is not only commendable but also crucial to the country's development. Earlier in 2016, Indonesia received USD 8.9 billion of remittances from its foreign labor force. The number is equal to 30% of overall valuation of Foreign Direct Investment and exceed the government spending on social aids (Purnamasari, 2017).

Remittance as External Source of Capital: Contribution to Bangladesh

Migrant remittances become not only additional but primary source of income in Bangladesh. The country received between USD 13 to 15.5 million per-annum from its labor force abroad. The strategic position of remittances stood second to garment production as the country's first source of income. The size is surprisingly equivalent to 8% of the annual GDP in the country (Wankel & Hipsher, 2012). Moreover, significant amount of remittance also helps the country to survive from the turbulence of global economy as it consistently bailed foreign exchange reserve in times of crisis as explained in the below chart:




Source: World Bank (2016).

Figure 4.

Remittance Received (% of GDP) - Indonesia, Bangladesh

Contribution to Indonesia

Indonesia is currently experiencing a series of historic number of remittances at least in the last three years. Indonesia received USD 8 to 10 million per annum stood as the largest in Southeast Asia. In 2016 alone, it received USD 8.9 billion which equivalent to 1% of Indonesia's total GDP (World Bank, 2016). Indonesian migrant workers popularly labelled as the heroes of foreign exchange as they contributed 10 percent of the total national revenue (Anwar, 2005).



Source: World Bank (2016).

Figure 5.

Remittance Received (% per GDP) Indonesia

After foreign direct investment (FDI), Indonesian overseas workers are the second largest contributor to the domestic foreign exchange income amounting to over

USD 7 billion per-annum (ILO, 2013). The consistently emerging trend is uniquely fostered by only 56 % of documented migrants, while the 46% of unregistered migrants is by far unidentified (Purnamasari, 2017).

Brain Drain and Compensation to Human Capital Lost

According to OECD, there is a least evidence that showing remittances has significant ability to bail the human capital loss in developing countries as it diminishes with consistent growth of education (OECD, 2006).

Human Capital Loss in Bangladesh

The above hypothesis is fairly contextualized in the case of Bangladesh. According to FAO, although the remittances play major contribution in agriculture sector to foster import and export activities. However, the loss of highly skilled labored has decreased the amount of intellectual farmers (Sadewa et al., 2020). Nonetheless, it does not show downward trend of production in the past five years (Islam, 2015). Eventually, Bangladesh seems to remain steadfast on its exploitative migration policy to ease overseas working permit to the maximum degree. This is not only to keep domestic production prudent but also to safeguard the foreign exchange saving for future prospect.

Human Capital Loss in Indonesia

Primarily, human capital loss in the country is compensated by the reconstruction of education system (Adam & Negara, 2015). The distribution ensured by the national constitution that 20% percent of national revenue accounts for education (Adam & Negara, 2015). This revenue is projected primarily in outermost and vulnerable territories. This is carried out by the current administration to foster not only equal distribution of educational access but also equal quality of education itself in the peripheries. This is enabled by a

number of international scholarship schemes that enabled domestic teachers and academicians particularly from underdeveloped zones to attain international standardized education abroad (Adam & Negara, 2015). This strategy has been executed not only to compensate but to control human capital loss in the lowest possible degree.

Contribution of Remittances to Indonesia and Bangladesh Domestic Development

For Bangladesh, exploiting labor force overseas is critical to unravel the overloaded domestic labor market. Currently with around 1.8 million population entering the labor market, the easiest method to ease the market is through overseas migration to seek for remittance. In addition, remittance boost household consumption and saving significantly (Purnamasari, 2017). It is primarily benefitted for food (39%), land purchase (17%), loan reimbursement (9%), education (5%), and health (4%) (Wankel & Hipsher, 2012).

Following the massive growth of remittance enrollment, Indonesia seizes the opportunity to maximize the benefits of its overseas workers primarily to expand its diplomatic influence through a number of agreements that loose bureaucratic process for approval in destination countries (Bachtiar, 2011). The remittance also strengthen budget for protection of abroad entities whenever necessary by the establishment of several new consulate offices (Ukhtiyani & Indartono, 2020). This is based on the fact that most Indonesian workers experienced violent discrimination in destination countries primarily in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia (Tan & Shahrullah, 2017). Thus, comprehensive protection measure is considerably important. In addition, remittances are also benefitted to accelerate the government grand infrastructure project (Ukhtiyani & Indartono, 2020) and incentivize small

medium enterprises and tech-enabled startups through the national projection of 1000 medium-unicorn startups (Purnamasari, 2017).

CONCLUSION

The ultimate challenge of Rohingya refugee migration is the imbalance amount of incoming population and the limited amounts of financial assistantship from the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to cover housing and livelihood provisions for refugees. Host country's funding capability is extremely limited especially to Bangladesh whose receiving refugees amidst of economic decline. Meanwhile, Indonesia is currently facing demographic bonus whereby it anticipates funds for developing industry and infrastructure. Instead of allocating considerable funds to UNHCR camps, it focuses on domestic consolidation in Myanmar by building schools and mosque in Rakhine state. This disproportionate assistance has made the crisis prolonged with issues of illegal migration across the countries.

When it comes to refugee migration influence and contribution to host

countries, in Bangladesh the issue has been extremely burdening economically following the economic decline and the wave of illegal migrants. For Indonesia, refugee migration can be both detrimental and advantageous. Indonesia is currently facing massive demographic challenge and galvanizing economic reform in its outermost territories. Hence, allocating funds for massive amount of refugee may distract economic growth target in 2019 which politically influence electoral capacity of the incumbent. However, the issue can also be a significant bargaining milestone as the country is leading regional peace initiative in ASEAN. Therefore, Indonesia's leading role in mitigating the world's fastest refugee crisis has secured Indonesia's campaign for UN Security Council Non-Permanent Membership (2019-2021).

Eventually, the issue of refugee migration has two sides in a coin. It can be beneficial in term of regional and global positioning while at the same time can be a major setback for poor performing country amidst the declining global economy.

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