



MEASURING ASEAN INTEGRATION ON THE INDONESIA - MALAYSIA BORDER THROUGH A SECURITY COMMUNITY FRAMEWORK

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Abstract. ASEAN has declared itself as the ASEAN Community in 2015. For this reason, ASEAN has three pillars: the economic pillar, the political -security pillar, and the social- cultural pillar. As a security community, the depth of these three pillars can, of course, be measured. To measure this, this research intends to measure the level of depth of the ASEAN security community on the Indonesia - Malaysia border. This research uses qualitative research with primary sources of information, interviews, and official government documents. This research uses a security community analysis framework. The results of this research are (1) ASEAN has a framework for moving towards an ASEAN security community, (2) in the process of forming an ASEAN security community, there are differences in depth between pillars where the socio-cultural pillar is slower, (3) this results in "we feeling" as the ASEAN community is not felt by the people on the Indonesia-Malaysia border.

Keywords: security community, ASEAN, borders, Indonesia and Malaysia

A. Introduction

The Southeast Asian region, geopolitically and geoeconomically, is considered to have strategic value, making it the target of the interests of significant countries after World War II. Competition between superpowers and other major powers in this region was seen in the Vietnam War. Apart from that, conflicts of interest also occur between fellow Southeast Asian countries, such as the "confrontation" between Indonesia and Malaysia, which started with the seizure of Sabah.

Before the formation of ASEAN in 1967, Southeast Asian countries had made various efforts to foster regional cooperation, both intra and extra-regional, such as the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), Malaya, Philippines, Indonesia (MAPHILINDO), SouthEast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC). This was done to reduce mutual suspicion and minimize tensions between countries in the region. All of this cooperation was influential in forming ASEAN at a later stage, although in ASA or MAPHILINDO, for example, there was no impressive success. ASA only lasted six years, namely from 1961-1966. It can be said that its effectiveness was only three years, namely from June 1961 to April 1963.

Meanwhile, Maphilindo, who was talked about after the Manila Summit, which resulted in the Manila Declaration, finally died. Even the Philippines seems to never take care of it anymore. However, in the Malaysian Federation conflict process, Maphilindo, which consists of three countries, finally involved Thailand. The historical process of closeness between the four countries continues. Throughout history, these four countries became sponsors of the founding of ASEAN, plus Singapore.



As has been discussed regarding the motivation or desires of the five countries for the formation of ASEAN, the relationship between the five countries is relatively high-tense. For example, Singapore-Malaysia has poor relations because of the Malaysian Federation case, Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines have territorial sovereignty disputes and confrontations, and Thailand-Malaysia also has cases in southern Thailand. Even though there have been changes in leadership in several countries, which have also changed the implementation of foreign policy, it must be supported that the formation of ASEAN was initially filled with various suspicions. This is coupled with history where countries in Southeast Asia, except Thailand, were colonized countries whose natural resources were robbed and exploited for hundreds of years by European nations. This exploitation even made European countries at that time prosperous amidst the oppression of the people of the colonized nations. During the colonial period, tribes within the country were pitted against each other, giving rise to conflicts that, to this day, still have the potential to cause division. The struggle for independence against the colonialists lasted quite a long time and was relatively energy-intensive. Therefore, countries in Southeast Asia need more experience in cooperation at the regional level.

Therefore, the initial stages of ASEAN's founding are said to be a period when ASEAN was not yet solid due to the historical trauma that was full of disputes in the past. Therefore, ASEAN as a regional organization has yet to do much, which is considered stagnant. Many experts call ASEAN at this stage a “nonsense club” that is slow in making decisions. [1]

B. Methods

The methodology employed in this research report is a literature study, which systematically collects and analyzes existing research, scholarly articles, and theoretical frameworks related to the topic. This approach allows for a comprehensive understanding of the subject by synthesizing insights from various sources. Through a detailed review of academic journals, books, and relevant studies, we identified key themes in the existing body of knowledge, providing an argument for this report. Literature study methodologies are particularly useful in generating theoretical conclusions based on established research.

C. Results And Discussion

1. Security Community

Karl Deutsch, in integration studies, uses the term security community. This term was then used in Southeast Asian regionalism with the term ASEAN Security Community. According to Deutsch, "A security community is considered to be a group which has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community accompanied by formal and informal institutions and practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with reasonable certainty over a long period." [2]

According to Deutsch in [3], the characteristics of achieving a security community are the achievement of "integration," namely the "feeling" of society, and the development of diplomatic-political-military practices that guarantee "over a long period of time" the hope of peaceful relations, among the population. Deutsch stated that there are three indicators of the existence of a security community (1) where policymakers of two or more political units and their societies in general stop contemplating the possibility of war together; and (2) where two or more countries cease allocating resources to build military capabilities aimed at each other (3) mutual acceptance and strict compliance with certain international legal rules and bilateral agreements when the collective objectives of the units are not aligned.

In forming a security community, there are at least three conceptual foundations. First, conditions arise that accelerate the formation of a security community, such as external threats that cause countries to unite to reduce their fears or concerns. Second, there are conducive factors that make these countries feel comfortable interacting with each other, and building



mutual trust to work together. Third, socialization does not only exist at the elite level, but also at the community level in these countries to form a collective identity. This is where the security community comes together. Starting from a sense of trust, a community tries to create a common identity or we feeling so that it can create a non-war community or security community.

Then, Christopher Roberts [4] created a description of security communities in the Southeast Asia region. Roberts conveyed four important components for ASEAN to become a security community, namely "security", "dependable expectations of peaceful change", "community", and "integration". The "security" element provides the foundation for the security concept that ASEAN will build. This safe situation is strongly influenced by the element "dependable expectations of peaceful change". Meanwhile, the existence of interdependence to create a peaceful situation results from the "community" element which provides an explanation that community is built through the interaction of all parties, not only between countries, but also between nations. In the end, continuous and long-term interaction will lead to long-term interests and create a feeling of "we feeling" in "integration". Thus, the four elements above are closely interconnected to create a security community. That is what ASEAN is trying to realize. [4]

According to Amitav Acharya, security communities can form between countries that have different views on liberal democracy or human rights. What is more important is that the people always maintain peaceful relations. Acharya defines the security community as "to use the idea of security community as a framework within which to examine the revolution and nature of ASEAN's political security role and identify it faces in developing a viable security community." [5] Acharya explained that ASEAN is an example of a pluralistic security community.

In the loose PSC, Amitav Acharya mentioned three key elements that create a security community. The first key element is institutions. Institutions are very crucial because they provide arrangements or equipment for the development of quality and an environment for countries to socialize with each other and make them understood and accepted by other countries in one group. For example, it can be explained by the inclusion of Vietnam which has a different basic ideology from the five countries that form ASEAN but can still have good relations with other countries. ASEAN institutions have a role in that.

The second key element is norms. Norms are, as explained by Amita Acharya citing Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*, standards of appropriate behaviour for actors in a security community. The third key element is identity. The development of a security community is a form of training in identity formation, or a stage where a "common identity or loyalty" will be created. [5] These three key elements are important instruments to see ASEAN's performance in dealing with regional security issues. Thus, in general, ASEAN regionalism can be seen as an ongoing process of identity formation, relying on norms in inter-state relations related to socialization and ways of making decisions in the region.

2. Toward ASEAN as a Community

If we are going back to the past, we could see how ASEAN as a regional organization was always trying to make some kind of "integrated community" in the region. In 1969, there were 98 projects carried out together. This number of projects continues to grow, 121 projects in 1971, 167 projects in 1973, 289 projects in 1974, and 188 projects in 1975. However, unfortunately this increasing number is not accompanied by the quality of the projects. At that time, a recommendation to hold seminars was frequent and easily included in the project category. One observer called ASEAN a regional organization that only "advances by numbers." [6]



The second phase of ASEAN development about the community and integration began with the first ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia. At the first Bali Summit, ASEAN did not invite heads of state outside ASEAN as observers. This means that when entering a new phase, ASEAN really wants to be seen as an autonomous regional organization, so that the decisions and policies produced at the summit are not based on the advice or influence of other countries. ASEAN in this second stage is trying to no longer be a regional organization that is stagnant and talks a lot. ASEAN wants to make important decisions, quality joint projects, and touch on various aspects. It was also at this stage that ASEAN developed into an increasingly important and large regional organization, with an increasingly wide range of partners. ASEAN is experiencing broader development and partnerships, which also proves that ASEAN's position is increasingly important for large countries at the global level. At this stage, another important development was the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) document. In the TAC, ASEAN is determined to carry out more meaningful cooperation commitments in the economic, socio-cultural, scientific, as well as technical and administrative related matters, wrapped in the ideals of regionalist progress.

The TAC document then formulated six principles that must be respected by the signatories of what would later be called Bali Concord I. These principles are (1) mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; (2) the right of each nation to exist free from interference, subversion, or coercion; (3) do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries; (4) resolving disputes by peaceful means; (5) promise not to make threats or use violence; (6) establishing effective cooperation within ASEAN. It can be seen that the principle of non-intervention is again emphasized as one of the principles of intra-ASEAN relations.

The third development occurred in Bali Concord II when regional integration deepened. The strategic step taken by ASEAN towards the 21st century is to agree to develop an integrated region by forming a community of Southeast Asian countries that is open, peaceful, stable and prosperous, caring for each other, bound together in a dynamic partnership in 2020. This was outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020 in Kuala Lumpur in 1997. To realize this hope, ASEAN ratified the Bali Concord II at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali in 2003 which agreed to the formation of the ASEAN Community (ASEAN Community). Bali Concord II contains several important things in three main areas as follows:

- a. Politics and Security: Establishment of the ASEAN Security Community, including peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, ensuring a nuclear-free Southeast Asia region, and preventing terrorism and transnational crime.
 - b. Economy: Establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community to achieve ASEAN economic integration in 2020 (which was then accelerated to 2015), and towards a stable, prosperous and competitive ASEAN economic region.
 - c. Socio-Cultural: Formation of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Strengthening solidarity among ASEAN citizens. Support each other in overcoming poverty, equality and human development
3. The Community and “We Feeling”

ASEAN's aspiration to become a pluralistic security community rest on the premise that member states will develop a shared identity that transcends national borders, leading to greater regional peace and stability. This shared identity is captured by the concept of "we feeling," which is the cornerstone of the ASEAN community's cohesion. For the organization to function as a security community, member states need to perceive themselves as part of a collective unit, committed to peaceful interactions and mutual respect. This vision was further enshrined in the



Bali Concord II of 2003, which laid out the blueprint for the establishment of the ASEAN Community, consisting of three pillars: the ASEAN Political-Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. [7] While the economic and political-security pillars have made significant progress, the socio-cultural pillar, which is crucial to generating this "we feeling," has lagged behind.

These facts, truthfully, looks like anomaly in the dynamics of ASEAN as an organization itself. As we mentioned before, ASEAN was formed because of the idea of togetherness. From the same historical background, the same feeling of being colonized and so on. Hence, in the daily basis of ASEAN itself as an organization, the we feeling just ended in the treaty or the meeting. People who stays regularly in the border hardly touch the "we feeling" that already been described by the founding fathers.

As we explained above, the effort for the integrated community has been done repeatedly by some of formal meeting by the members; but how about the social part of the regional? The slower integration of the socio-cultural pillar within ASEAN is one of the main reasons for the failure to generate a stronger sense of "we feeling" in regions like the Indonesia-Malaysia border. While the economic and political-security pillars have received significant attention and resources, the socio-cultural pillar, which focuses on fostering people-to-people connections, shared values, and a sense of collective identity, has lagged behind. [7] This pillar is essential for building the foundation of ASEAN's security community, as it is meant to bridge the cultural, linguistic, and social differences among member states and their populations.

Nevertheless, the socio-cultural pillar has struggled to make a tangible impact, especially in border regions. Research indicates that people in these areas are more likely to identify with their national or local identities than with a broader ASEAN identity. [8] In the Indonesia-Malaysia border region, ethnic and linguistic differences further complicate the development of a shared regional identity. Communities living along the border are often more concerned with local issues, such as economic survival, migration, and cross-border smuggling, than with abstract notions of regionalism. Consequently, the socio-cultural integration that is supposed to foster "we feeling" has been slow to take root.

4. The Weak "We Feeling" and Story about Malaysia-Indonesia Border

The Indonesia-Malaysia border region serves as an example of the challenges ASEAN faces in cultivating a collective identity. This region, where communities live on the fringes of their respective countries, has historically experienced weak integration with the rest of the ASEAN framework. Research shows that for many of the people living in these border communities, ASEAN remains a distant and abstract concept, primarily associated with diplomatic relations and elite-level agreements. [7] While ASEAN leaders frequently champion the idea of a regional identity, the lived experiences of border populations often reflect a disconnection from this vision.

This lack of integration is further compounded by socio-economic disparities in the region. The Indonesia-Malaysia border, particularly in areas such as West Kalimantan and Sabah, remains economically underdeveloped compared to more urbanized and connected parts of both countries. Economic disparities and uneven development have created conditions where border communities do not feel the direct benefits of ASEAN's regional integration projects, such as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). In fact, for many, ASEAN appears as a distant organization that has little to do with their everyday struggles. [8] The concept of "we feeling" cannot thrive in such an environment, where the fruits of regionalism are seen as exclusive to elites and more developed urban centers.

Obviously, this condition is miserable. Moreover, this happens on the border of Indonesia and Malaysia which from the beginning has been depicted in the concept of a single community. If we look at the views of the founding fathers regarding, "we feeling", of course Indonesia and



Malaysia are the ones that get the most spotlight in it; especially the idea of an integrated community. However, the we feeling that is depicted quite ideally in a single community, the evidence is almost non-existent. It does seem petty, if we compare the conditions that occur due to economic disparities. But the existence of extreme economic differences in the midst of the we feeling narrative is an early warning that we feeling is only a narrative felt by the upper class, not by the community, especially on the border. Looking back at the explanation regarding the ASEAN Community, ASEAN itself tends to move towards the ASEAN Political Security Community, compared to other communities. This of course creates disparities because political and security issues will tend to be dynamic for those in government. What about those at the grassroots or the community in general? Of course, they will look for where ASEAN will be present for them as the ASEAN community.

D. Conclusion

In conclusion, ASEAN's goal of creating a pluralistic security community based on a shared "we feeling" remains a work in progress. While progress has been made in the economic and political-security realms, the socio-cultural pillar, which is crucial for fostering a sense of regional identity, has lagged behind. The Indonesia-Malaysia border region exemplifies the challenges ASEAN faces in promoting this "we feeling," as local communities remain disconnected from ASEAN's broader vision. Without more inclusive and grassroots-focused initiatives, the dream of a cohesive ASEAN identity may remain elusive. ASEAN must prioritize deeper socio-cultural integration, especially in border regions, to ensure that its vision of a security community becomes a reality for all its citizens.

E. References

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